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Abstract
This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged
in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not
only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over
time, but never ceases as long as the project has not succeeded. In fact, the delay until
the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why
deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.
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Introduction
Cooperation evolves over time. A lack of tangible results often breeds mistrust, and mistrust

leads to lower levels of commitment. Agents grow suspicious that other team members are not
pulling their weight in the common enterprise and scale back their own involvement in response.
Is this bleak scenario the fate of every team project? What can be done to avert such a scenario?
This paper develops a formal framework to address these questions.
∗
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In modern times, collaborations have proven crucial in the production of knowledge at the
level of individual researchers and institutions.1 Teamwork is a special case of private provision
of public goods: when it is hard to quantify the contribution of each member on the advancement
of a project, free-riding arises. What sets teamwork apart from most existing models of provision
of public goods, though, is the uncertainty regarding the intrinsic feasibility of the project. As of
today, and despite the best efforts of minds as brilliant as Newton’s, the legendary “philosopher’s
stone” that would convert base metals into gold has not been found. Applications of the private
provision of public goods under uncertainty can be found not only in the direct production of
knowledge, but also in its financing. Consider, for instance, a public good of unknown value,
such as voluntary contributions (donations) to medical research. Other applications include
donations to charity, and investment in research and development (R&D) by firms engaged in a
joint venture.
With very few exceptions, most of the work on public goods deals with situations that are
either static or involve complete information. This work has provided invaluable insights into the
underprovision of the public good in quantity terms. In contrast, given the scope for learning,
our interest lies with the dynamics of this provision.
The key features of our model are the following: (i) Benefits are public, costs are private: the
profit, or value, from completing the project is common to all agents. All it takes to complete
the project is one breakthrough, but making a breakthrough requires costly effort. (ii) Success is
uncertain: some projects are doomed to failure, no matter how much effort is put into them. As
for the other projects, the flow probability of a breakthrough increases as the combined effort of
the agents increases. Achieving a breakthrough is the only way to ascertain the project’s type.
(iii) Effort is hidden: the choice of effort exerted by an agent is unobserved by the other agents.
1
Although Dasgupta (1988) credits Klein and Lie with the first collaborative research in academia resulting
in joint publication, for their article on group theory in 1870, collaborative papers can be traced back to 1665
and the joint paper by Hooke, Oldenburg, Cassini and Boyle. This is not to say that collaborations did not take
place throughout scientific history, as the well-known collaborations of Kepler and Brahe, Lavoisier and Laplace,
or Gauss and Weber illustrate.
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As long as there is no breakthrough, agents receive no hard evidence whatsoever; they simply
become (weakly) more pessimistic about the prospects of the project as time goes on. This
captures the idea that output is observable, but effort is not. We shall contrast our findings with
the case in which effort is observable. At the end of the paper, we also discuss the intermediate
case in which a project involves several observable steps.
Our main findings are the following:
- Agents procrastinate: as is to be expected, agents slack off, i.e., there is underprovision
of effort overall. Agents do not only exert too little effort, but they also do so too late.
In the hope that the effort of others will suffice, they work less than they should early
on, postponing effort to later dates. Nevertheless, due to growing pessimism, the effort
expended dwindles over time, but the plug on the project is never pulled. Although the
overall effort expended is independent of the size of the team, the more agents are involved
in the project, the later the project gets completed on average, if ever.
- Deadlines are beneficial: if agents have enough resolve to fix themselves a deadline, it is
optimal to do so. This is the case despite the fact that agents pace themselves so that,
if the deadline is hit, the project is abandoned at a point at which the project is still
worthwhile. If agents could re-negotiate at this time, they would. But the deadline gives
agents incentives to exert effort once it looms close enough. The deadline is desirable,
because the reduction in wasteful delay more than offsets the value that is forfeited if the
deadline is reached. In this sense, the delay is more costly than the underprovision of effort.
- Better monitoring need not reduce delay: when effort is observed, there are multiple equilibria. Depending on the equilibrium, delay might be greater or smaller than under nonobservability. In the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium, delay is actually greater.
This is because individual efforts are strategic substitutes. The prospects of the team
improve if it is found that an agent has slacked off, because this mitigates the growing pes3

simism in the team. Therefore, an observable reduction in current effort encourages later
effort by other members, and this depresses equilibrium effort. Hence, better monitoring
need not alleviate moral hazard. Nevertheless, there are also non-Markovian, “grim-trigger”
equilibria for which delay is smaller.
Some insights into the relevance of these findings can be gleaned from the data collected by
Ellison (2002). For papers that get eventually published, Ellison (2002) shows that the number
of coauthors has a positive effect on the time lag between the submission and acceptance of the
paper. This agrees with our finding that increasing the team size increases the expected delay.
However, a closer look at the data used by Ellison (2002) reveals that the time lag between
submission and acceptance is decreasing in the number of coauthors when these coauthors are
located in the same department, which presumably facilitates monitoring. This is evidence
suggesting that the Markovian equilibrium outcome in the observable case does not describe
actual behavior.
The value of deadline raises the issue of mechanism design. We derive the optimal dynamic
(budget-balanced) compensation scheme, as well as the optimal wage scheme for a principal who
owns the project’s returns.
We then investigate the role of synergies. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have already
pointed out, it is likely that an important factor in the formation of teams is the team members’
potential to work synergistically. That is, total output might not be separable in the agents’
efforts. To account for this phenomenon, we examine two extensions of the baseline model. In the
first extension, workers may have similar skills, but their efforts get combined in a non-separable
way. For concreteness, we consider the case in which the arrival rate of success in case the project
is good is a constant elasticity function of their individual efforts. In the second extension, we
focus on two agents and consider the case in which agents possess different skills, so that one
worker might be able to succeed where another could not.
These two kinds of synergy lead to different kinds of behavior. In the first case, there are
4

multiple equilibria that are all inefficient. In all equilibria, all agents put in some effort. These
equilibria illustrate the distinction between the amount and the allocation of effort: the symmetric
equilibrium is characterized by free-riding and significant delay, but it also is the one in which
the probability of a breakthrough is greatest. In the second case, the agent that is viewed as
most likely to succeed starts by exerting effort by himself, at a level that is socially efficient. As
time passes by and no breakthrough occurs, the difference in the likelihoods of success across
agents levels off. When both agents are equally likely to succeed, they both start to exert effort,
but these effort levels are low because of free-riding. Unless a breakthrough occurs, both agents
keep on exerting effort forever, albeit at rapidly declining levels.
Finally, we consider the case in which completing a project involves several tasks. Tasks
are independent. We are particularly interested in understanding how the type of the tasks
affects the structure and efficiency of equilibria. Following the literature on social psychology, we
distinguish between (i) additive tasks, in which payoffs are additively separable in the tasks, (ii)
conjunctive tasks, in which both tasks must be completed, and (iii) disjunctive tasks, in which
the project is completed as soon as there is a breakthrough in one task. Efficiency requires tasks
to be worked on simultaneously when they are additive, but sequentially if they are conjunctive.
However, there are equilibria in which agents specialize and work simultaneously on different
tasks when they are conjunctive.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, our model can be viewed as a
model of experimentation. There is a growing literature in economics on experimentation in
teams. For instance, Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) study a twoarmed bandit problem in which different agents may choose different arms. While free-riding
plays an important role in these papers as well, effort is always observable. Rosenberg, Solan
and Vieille (2007), Hopenhayn and Squintani (2008) and Murto and Välimäki (2008) consider
the case in which the outcome of each agent’s action is unobservable, while their actions are
observable. This is precisely the opposite of what is assumed in this paper; here, actions are not
observed, but outcomes are. Bergemann and Hege (2005) study a principal-agent relationship
5

with an information structure similar to the one considered here. All these models provide
valuable insights into how much total experimentation is socially desirable, and how much can
be expected in equilibrium. As will be clear, these questions admit trivial answers in our model,
which is therefore not well-suited to address those.
Mason and Välimäki (2008) consider a dynamic moral hazard problem in which effort by
a single agent is unobservable. Although there is no learning, the optimal wage declines over
time, to provide incentives for effort. Their model shares with ours some common features. In
particular, the strategic substitutability between current and later efforts plays an important
role in both models, so that, in both cases, deadlines have beneficial effects. See also Toxvaerd
(2007) on deadlines, and Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) on similar effects in the optimal provision
of incentives in sequential search.
Second, our model ties into the literature on free-riding in groups, starting with Olson (1965)
and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and further studied in Holmström (1982), Legros and Matthews
(1993), and Winter (2004). In a sequential setting, Strausz (1999) describes an optimal sharing
rule. More precisely, ours is a dynamic version of moral hazard in teams with uncertain output.
The static version was introduced by Williams and Radner (1988) and also studied by Ma, Moore
and Turnbull (1988). The inefficiency of equilibria of repeated partnership games with imperfect
monitoring has been first demonstrated by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986).
Third, our paper is related to the literature on dynamic contributions to public goods. Games
with observable contributions are examined in Admati and Perry (1991), Compte and Jehiel
(2004), Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Marx and Matthews
(2000). Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) compare open- and closed-loop equilibria in a set-up
with complete information and find that observability exacerbates free-riding. In Bag and Roy
(2008), Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), and Gradstein (1992), agents have independently drawn and
privately known values for the public good. This type of private information is briefly discussed
in the conclusion. Applications to partnerships include Levin and Tadelis (2005), and Hamilton,
Nickerson and Owan (2003). Also related is the literature in management on alliances, including,
6

for instance, Doz (1996), Gulati (1995) and Gulati and Singh (1998).
There is a vast literature on free-riding, also known as social loafing, in social psychology.
See, for instance, Latané, Williams and Harkins (1979), or Karau and Williams (1993). Levi
(2007) provides a survey of group dynamics and team theory. The stage theory, developed by
Tuckman and Jensen (1977) and the theory by McGrath (1991) are two of the better known
theories regarding the development of project teams – the patterning of change and continuity
in team structure and behavior over time.

2

A Simple Example
Consider the following two-period game. Agent i = 1, 2 may exert effort in two periods

t = 1, 2, in order to achieve a breakthrough. Whether a breakthrough is possible or not depends
on the quality of the project. If the project is good, the probability of a breakthrough in period
t (assuming that there was no breakthrough before) is given by the sum of the effort levels ui,t
that the two agents choose in that period. However, the project might be bad, in which case a
breakthrough is impossible. Agents share a common prior belief p̄ < 1 that the project is good.
The project ends if a breakthrough occurs. A breakthrough is worth a payoff of 1 to both
agents, independently of who is actually responsible for this breakthrough. Effort, on the other
hand, entails a private cost given by c(ui,t ) in each period. Payoffs from the second period are
discounted at a common factor δ ≤ 1.
Agents do not observe their partner’s effort choice. All they observe is whether a breakthrough
occurs or not. Therefore, if there is no breakthrough at the end of the first period, agents update
their belief about the quality of the project based only on their own effort choice, and their
expectation about the other agent’s effort choice. Thus, if an agent chooses an effort level ui,t in
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each period, and expects his opponent to exert effort û−i,t, his expected payoff is given by
p̄ · (ui,1 + û−i,1 ) − c(ui,1 ) + δ(1 − p̄ · (ui,1 + û−i,1))[ρ(ui,1, û−i,1) · (ui,2 + ûi,2) − c(ui,2 )],
|
{z
}
|
{z
}
First period payoff

(1)

Second period payoff

where ρ(ui,1 , û−i,1) is his posterior belief that the project is good. To understand (1), note that
the probability of a breakthrough in the first period is the product of the prior belief assigned
to the project being good (p̄), and the sum of effort levels exerted (ui,1 + û−i,1). The payoff of
such a breakthrough is 1. The cost of effort in the first period, c(ui,1 ), is paid in any event. If a
breakthrough does not occur, agent i updates his belief to ρ(ui,1, û−i,1), and the structure of the
payoff in the second period is as in the first period.
By Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief of agent i is given by
ρ(ui,1, û−i,1) =

p̄ · (1 − ui,1 − û−i,1 )
≤ p̄.
1 − p̄ · (ui,1 + û−i,1 )

(2)

Note that this is based on agent i’s expectation of agent −i’s effort choice. That is, agents’ beliefs
are private, and they only coincide on the equilibrium path. If, for instance, agent i decides to
exert more effort than he is expected to by agent −i, yet no breakthrough occurs, agent i will
become more pessimistic than agent −i, unbeknownst to him. Off-path, beliefs are no longer
common knowledge.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, agent i’s effort levels (ui,1, ui,2) are optimal given (û−i,1 , û−i,2),
and expectations are correct: û−i,t = u−i,t . Letting Vi denote the agent’s payoff, it must be that
∂Vi
= p̄ − c′ (ui,1) − δ p̄ · (ui,2 + û−i,2 − c(ui,2)) = 0,
∂ui,1
and
∂Vi
∝ ρ(ui,1 , û−i,1) − c′ (ui,2) = 0,
∂ui,2
so that, in particular, c′ (ui,2 ) < 1. It follows that (i) the two agents’ first-period effort choices are
8

neither strategic complements nor substitutes, but (ii) an agent’s effort choices across periods
are strategic substitutes, as are (iii) an agent’s current effort choice and the other agent’s future
effort choices.
It is evident from (ii) that the option to delay reduces effort in the first period. Comparing
the one- and two-period models is equivalent to comparing the first-period effort choice for
ui,2 = ûi,2 = 0 on the one hand, and a higher value on the other. This is what we refer to
as procrastination: some of the work that would otherwise be carried out by some date gets
postponed when agents get further opportunities to work afterwards.2 In our example, imposing
a deadline of one period heightens incentives in the initial period.
Further, it is also clear from (iii) that observability of the first period’s action will lead to
a decline in effort provision. With observability, a small decrease in the first-period effort level
increases the other agent’s effort tomorrow. Therefore, relative to the case in which effort choices
are unobservable, each agent has an incentive to lower his first-period effort level in order to
induce his partner to work harder in the second period, when his choice is observable.
As we shall see, these findings carry through with longer horizons: deadlines are desirable,
while observability, or better monitoring, is not. However, this two-period model is ill-suited
to describe the dynamics of effort over time when there is no last period. To address this and
related issues, it is best to consider a baseline model in which the horizon is infinite. This model
is described next.

3

The Set-up
There are n agents engaged in a common project. The project has a probability p < 1 of

being a good project, and this is commonly known by the agents. It is a bad project otherwise.
Agents continuously choose at which level to exert effort over the infinite horizon R+ . Effort
is costly, and the instantaneous cost to agent i = 1, . . . , n of exerting effort ui ∈ R+ is ci (ui ),
2

To procrastinate is to “delay or postpone action,” as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary.

9

for some function ci (·) that is differentiable and strictly increasing. In most of the paper, we
assume that ci (ui) = ci · ui , for some constant ci > 0, and that the choice is restricted to the unit
interval, i.e. ui ∈ [0, 1]. The effort choice is, and remains, unobserved.
Effort is necessary for a breakthrough to occur. More precisely, a breakthrough occurs with
instantaneous probability equal to f (u1 , . . . , un ), if the project is good, and to zero if the project
is bad. That is, if agents were to exert a constant effort ui over some interval of time, then the
delay until they found out that the project is successful would be distributed exponentially over
that time interval with parameter f (u1 , . . . , un ). The function f is differentiable and strictly
increasing in each of its arguments. In the baseline model, we assume that f is additively
P
separable and linear in effort choices, so that f (u1, . . . , un ) = i=1,...,n λi ui , for some λi > 0,
i = 1, . . . , n.

The game ends if a breakthrough occurs. Let τ ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} denote the random time at
which the breakthrough occurs (τ = +∞ if it never does). We interpret such a breakthrough
as the successful completion of the project. A successful project is worth a net present value of
1 to each of the agents.3 As long as no breakthrough occurs, agents reap no benefits from the
project. Agents are impatient, and discount future benefits and costs at a common discount rate
r.
If agents exert effort (u1 , . . . , un ), and a breakthrough arrives at time t < ∞, the average
discounted payoff to agent i is thus


−rt

r e

−

Z

t
−rs

e

0



ci (ui,s)ds ,

while if a breakthrough never arrives (t = ∞), his payoff is simply −r

R∞
0

e−rs ci (ui,s )ds. The

agent’s objective is to choose his effort so as to maximize his expected payoff.
To be more precise, a (pure) strategy for agent i is a measurable function ui : R+ → [0, 1], with
the interpretation that ui,t is the instantaneous effort exerted by agent i at time t, conditional
3

We discuss this assumption further in Section 4.2.
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on no breakthrough having occurred. Given a strategy profile u := (u1 , . . . , un ), it follows from
Bayes’ rule that the belief held in common by the agents that the project is good (hereafter, the
common belief), p, is given by the solution to the familiar differential equation
ṗt = −pt (1 − pt )f (ut ),
with p0 = p.4 Given that the probability that the project is good at time t is pt , and that the
instantaneous probability of a breakthrough conditional on this event is f (ut ), the instantaneous
probability assigned by the agent to a breakthrough occurring is pt f (ut ). It follows that the
expected instantaneous reward to agent i at time t is given by pt f (ut) − ci (ui,t ). Given that the
Rt
probability that a breakthrough has not occurred by time t is given by exp{− 0 ps f (us )ds}, it
follows that the average (expected) payoff that agent i seeks to maximize is given by
r

Z

0

∞

(pt f (ut ) − ci (ui,t )) e−

Rt

0 (ps f (us )+r)ds

dt.

Given that there is a positive probability that the game lasts forever, and that agent i’s information set at any time t is trivial, strategies that are part of a Nash equilibrium are also sequentially
rational on the equilibrium path; hence, our objective is to identify the symmetric Nash equilibria
of this game. (We shall nevertheless briefly describe off-the-equilibrium-path behavior as well.)
4

To see this, note that, given pt , the belief at time t + dt is
pt+dt =

pt e−f (ut )dt
,
1 − pt + pt e−f (ut )dt

by Bayes’ rule. Subtracting pt on both sides, dividing by dt and taking limits gives the result.
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4

The Benchmark Model
We begin the analysis with the special case in which agents are symmetric, and both the

instantaneous probability and the cost functions are linear in effort:
f (u1 , . . . , un ) =

n
X

λi ui,

ci (ui) = ci ui,

ui ∈ [0, 1],

i=1

λi = λ,

ci = c, for all i.

Equivalently, we may define the normalized cost α := c/λ, and redefine ui, so that each agent
chooses the control variable ui : R+ → [0, λ] so as to maximize
Vi (p) := r

Z

∞

pt

0

X
i

!

ui,t − αui,t e−

Rt

0 (ps

P

i

ui,s +r)ds

dt,

(3)

subject to
ṗt = −pt (1 − pt )

X

ui,t, p0 = p.

i

Observe that the parameter α is the Marshallian threshold: it is equal to the belief at which
a myopic agent would stop working, because at this point the instantaneous marginal revenue
from effort, pt , equals the marginal cost, α.

4.1

The Team Problem

If agents behaved cooperatively, they would choose efforts so as to maximize the sum of their
individual payoffs, that is,
W (p) :=

n
X

Vi (p) = r

i=1

where, with some abuse of notation, ut :=

Z

∞
0

P

i

(npt − α) ut e−

Rt

0 (ps us +r)ds

dt,

ui,t ∈ [0, nλ]. The integrand being positive as long

as pt ≥ α/n, it is clear that it is optimal to set ut equal to nλ as long as pt ≥ α/n, and to zero
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otherwise. The belief pt is then given by
pt =

p̄
,
p̄ + (1 − p̄)enλt

as long as the right-hand side exceeds α/n. In short, the team solution specifies that each agent
sets his effort as follows:
ui,t = λ if t ≤ Tn := (nλ)−1 ln

p̄(1 − α/n)
, and ui,t = 0 for t > Tn .
(1 − p̄)α/n

Not surprisingly, the resulting payoff is decreasing in the discount rate r and the normalized cost
α, and increasing in the prior p̄, the upper bound λ and the number of agents, n.
Observe that the instantaneous marginal benefit from effort to an agent is equal to pt , which
decreases over time, while the marginal cost is constant and equal to α. Therefore, it will not be
possible to provide incentives for selfish agents to exert effort beyond the Marshallian threshold.
The wedge between this threshold and the efficient one, α/n, captures the well-known free-riding
effect in teams, which is described eloquently by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and has since been
studied extensively. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the amount of effort is too low.5 Here
instead, our focus is on how free-riding affects when effort is exerted.

4.2

The Non-Cooperative Solution

As mentioned above, once the common belief drops below the Marshallian threshold, agents
do not provide any effort. Therefore, if p ≤ α, there is a unique equilibrium, in which no agent
ever works, and we might as well assume throughout that p > α. Further, we assume throughout
5

There is neither an “encouragement effect” in our set-up, unlike in some papers on experimentation (see, for
instance, Bolton and Harris (1999)), nor any effect of patience on the threshold. This is because a breakthrough
yields a unique lump sum to all agents, rather than conditionally independent sequences of lump sum payoffs.
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this section that agents are sufficiently patient. More precisely, the discount rate satisfies
λ
≥ α−1 − p−1 > 0.
r

(4)

This assumption ensures that the upper bound on the effort level does not affect the analysis.
The proof of the main result of this section relies on Pontryagin’s principle, but the gist of it is
perhaps best understood by the following heuristic argument from dynamic programming.
What is the trade-off between exerting effort at some instant and exerting it at the next? Fix
some date t, and assume that players have followed the equilibrium strategies up to that date.
Fix also some small dt > 0, and consider the gain or loss from shifting some small effort ε from
the time interval [t, t+ dt] (“today”) to the time interval [t+ dt, t+ 2dt] (“tomorrow”). Write ui, p
for ui,t , pt , and u′i , p′ for ui,t+dt , pt+dt , and let Vi,t , or Vi , denote the unnormalized continuation
payoff of agent i at time t. The payoff Vi,t must satisfy the recursion
Vi,t = (p(ui + u−i ) − αui )dt + (1 − rdt)(1 − p(ui + u−i )dt)Vi,t+dt .
Because we are interested in the trade-off between effort today and tomorrow, we apply the same
expansion to Vi,t+dt , to obtain
Vi,t = (p(ui + u−i) − αui)dt+



(1 − rdt)(1 − p(ui + u−i)dt) (p′ (u′i + u′−i ) − αu′i )dt + (1 − rdt)(1 − p′ (u′i + u′−i )dt)Vi,t+2dt , (5)
where p′ = p − p(1 − p)(ui + u−i)dt.6 Consider then decreasing ui by ε and increasing u′i by that
amount. Note that, conditional on reaching t + 2dt without a breakthrough, the resulting belief
is unchanged, and therefore, so is the continuation payoff. That is, Vi,t+2dt is independent of ε.
6

More precisely, for later purposes, e−p(ui +u−i )dt = 1 − p(ui + u−i )dt +

14

p2
2 (ui

+ u−i )2 (dt)2 + o(dt3 ).

Therefore, to the second order,
dVi,t /dε
= −((p − α) − pVi,t ) + (p − α) − pVi,t = 0.
|
|
{z
}
{z
}
dt
dVi,t /dui du
· dεi
dt

dVi,t /du′ du′
i
i·
dt
dε

To interpret this, note that increased effort affects the payoff in three ways: it increases the
probability of a breakthrough, yielding a payoff of 1, at a rate pt ; it causes the loss of the
continuation value Vi,t at the same rate; lastly, increasing effort increases cost, at a rate α.
The upshot of this result is that the trade-off between effort today and tomorrow can only
be understood by considering an expansion to the third-order. Here we must recall that the
probability of a breakthrough given effort level u is, to the third order, pudt − (pu)2 (dt)2 /2 (see

footnote 6); similarly, the continuation payoff is discounted by a factor e−rdt ≈ 1−rdt+r 2 (dt)2 /2.
Let us first expand terms in (5), which gives
Vi,t = (pu − αui )dt − (pu)2 dt2 /2 + (1 − (r + pu)dt + (r + pu)2 dt2 /2)·

 ′

(pu − αu′i )dt − ((1 − p)u + pu′ /2)pu′dt2 + [1 − (r + pu′ )dt + ((r + pu′ )2 /2 + p(1 − p)uu′ )dt2 ]Vi,t+2dt ,

where, for this equation and the next, u := ui + u−i , u′ := u′i + u′−i . We then obtain, ignoring
the second-order terms that, as shown, cancel out,
−

dVi,t /dui du
· dεi
dt2

z
}|
{
dVi,t /dε
2
′
′
′
=
p
u
+
p(pu
(1
−
V
)
−
αu
−
rV
)
−
(r
+
pu)pV
+
p(1
−
p)u
(1
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V
i
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i
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+ p(r + pu′)Vi − p(1 − p)u(1 − Vi ) − p2 u′ − (r + pu)(p(1 − Vi ) − α) .
{z
}
|
dVi,t /du′ du′
i·
i
dε
dt2

Assuming that ui and u−i are continuous, almost all terms vanish. We are left with
dVi,t /dε
= αp(ui + u−i ) − r(p − α) − αpui.
dt2
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This means that postponing effort to tomorrow is unprofitable if and only if
αpui ≥ αp(ui + u−i ) − r(p − α).

(6)

Equation (6) admits a simple interpretation. What is the benefit of working a bit more today,
relative to tomorrow? At a rate p (the current belief), working today increases the probability
of an immediate breakthrough, in which event the agent will not have to pay the cost of the
planned effort tomorrow (αui ). This is the left-hand side. What is the cost? If the agent waited
until tomorrow before working a bit harder, there is a chance that this extra effort will not have
to be carried out. The probability of this event is p · (ui + u−i ), and the cost saved is α per unit
of extra effort. This gives the first term on the right-hand side. Of course, there is also a cost of
postponing, given that agents are impatient. This cost is proportional to the mark-up of effort,
p − α, and gets subtracted on the right-hand side.
First, observe that, as p → α, the right-hand side of (6) exceeds the left-hand side if u−i is
bounded away from zero. Effort tends to zero as p tends to α. Similarly, effort must tend to zero
as r → 0.
Second, assume for the sake of contradiction that agents stop working at some finite time.
Then, considering the penultimate instant, it must be that, up to the second order, p − α =
p(1 − p)(ui + u−i )dt, and so we may divide both sides of (6) by ui + u−i = nui , yielding
p(1 − p)rdt ≥

n−1
αp,
n

which is impossible, as dt is arbitrarily small. Therefore, not only does effort go to zero as p
tends to α, but it does so sufficiently fast that the belief never reaches the threshold α, and
agents keep on working on the project forever, albeit at negligible rates.
It is now easy to guess what the equilibrium value of ui must be. Given that agent i must be
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indifferent between exerting effort or not, and also exerting it at different instants, we must have
r(α−1 − p−1 )
.
αpui = αp(ui + u−i ) − r(p − α), or ui (p) =
n−1
Hence, the common belief tends to the Marshallian threshold asymptotically, and total effort,
as a function of the belief, is actually decreasing in the number of agents. To understand this
last result, observe that the equilibrium reflects the logic of mixed strategies. Because efforts are
perfect substitutes, the indifference condition of each agent requires that the total effort by all
agents but him be a constant that depends on the belief, but not on the number of agents. Thus,
each agent’s level of effort must be decreasing in the number of agents. In turn, this implies
that the total effort by all agents for a given belief is the sum of a constant function and of a
decreasing function of the number of agents. Therefore, it is decreasing in the number of agents.
This simple logic relies on two substitutability assumptions: efforts of different agents are
perfect substitutes, and the cost function is linear. Both assumptions will be relaxed later.
We emphasize that, because effort is not observed, players only share a common belief on the
equilibrium path. For an arbitrary history, an agent’s best-reply depends both on the public and
on his private belief. Using dynamic programming is difficult, because the optimality equation is
then a partial differential equation. Pontryagin’s principle, on the other hand, is ideally suited,
because the other agents’ strategies can be viewed as fixed, given the absence of feedback.
The next theorem, proved in the appendix, describes the strategy on the equilibrium path.7
Theorem 1 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which, on the equilibrium path, the
level of effort of any agent is given by
u∗i,t =

r
n−11+

α−1 − 1

n
−1
(1−p)α n−1
e r(α −1)t
p−α

7

,

for all t ≥ 0.

(7)

In the case p = 1 that was ruled out earlier, the game reduces essentially to the static game. The effort level
−1
is constant and, because of free-riding, inefficiently low (ui,t = r(αn−1−1) ).
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If an agent deviated, what would his continuation strategy be? Suppose that this deviation
is such that, at time t, the aggregate effort of agent i alone over the interval [0, t] is lower than it
would have been on the equilibrium path. This means that agent i is more optimistic than the
other agents, and his private belief exceeds their common belief. Given that agent i would be
indifferent between exerting effort or not if he shared the common belief, his optimism leads him
to exert maximal effort until the time at which his private belief catches up with the other agents’
common belief, at which point he will revert to the common, symmetric strategy. If instead his
realized aggregate effort up to t is greater than in equilibrium, then he is more pessimistic than
the other agents, and he will provide no effort until the common belief catches up with his
private belief, if ever. This completes the description of the equilibrium strategy. In section 6,
we characterize asymmetric equilibria of the baseline model, and allow for asymmetries in the
players’ characteristics.
From (7), it is immediate to derive the following comparative statics. To avoid confusion, we
refer to total effort at time t as the sum of instantaneous, individual effort levels at that time,
and to aggregate effort at t as the sum (i.e. the integral) of total effort over all times up to t.
Lemma 1 In the symmetric equilibrium:
1. Effort decreases over time, and increases in r and p.
2. Aggregate effort decreases in α. It also decreases in, but is asymptotically independent of,
n: the probability of an eventual breakthrough is independent of the number of agents, but
the distribution of the time of the breakthrough with more agents first-order stochastically
dominates this distribution with fewer agents.
3. The agent’s payoff Vi (p) is increasing in n and p, decreasing in α, and independent of r.
Total effort is decreasing in n for a given belief p, so that total effort is also decreasing in n
for small enough t. However, this implies that the belief decreases more slowly with more agents.
Because effort is increasing in the belief, it must then be that total effort is eventually higher in
larger teams. Because the asymptotic belief is α, independently of n, aggregate effort must be
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independent of n as well. Ultimately, then, larger teams must catch up in terms of effort, but
this also means that larger teams are slower to succeed.8
Parameter Values: α=1/4, p =3/4, r=1/4
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Figure 1: Individual and total effort
In particular, for teams of different size, the distributions of the random time τ of a breakthrough, conditional on a breakthrough occurring eventually, are ranked by first order stochastic
dominance. We define the expected cost of delay as 1 − E[e−rτ |τ < ∞]. It follows from Lemma 1
that the cost of delay is increasing in n. However, it is independent of r, because more impatient
agents work harder, but discount the future more. As mentioned above, the agents’ payoffs are
also increasing in n. This is obvious for one vs. two agents, because an agent may always act as
if he were by himself, securing the payoff from a single-agent team. It is less obvious that larger,
slower teams achieve higher payoffs. Our result shows that, for larger teams, the reduction in
individual effort more than offsets the increased cost of delay. Figure 1 and the left panel of
Figure 2 illustrate these results.
Note that the comparative statics with respect to the number of agents hinge upon our
assumption that the project’s returns per agent were independent of n. If instead the total value
of the project is fixed independently of n, so that each agent’s share decreases linearly in n,
8

As a referee observed, this is reminiscent of the bystander effect, as in the Kitty Genovese case: because more
agents are involved, each agent optimally scales down his involvement, resulting in an outcome that worsens with
the number of agents.
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Parameter Values: α=0.1, p0=0.9, r=0.05
Payoffs, Expected Cost of Delay
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Figure 2: Payoffs and cost of delay. Left: value per agent = 1; right: value per agent = 1/n.
aggregate effort decreases with the team’s size, and tedious calculations show that each agent’s
payoff decreases as well. See the right panel of Figure 2 for an illustration.
While the symmetric equilibrium is unique, there exist other, asymmetric, equilibria. Consider, for instance, the case of two agents only (n = 2). If an agent were by himself, he would
behave as he would in the cooperative set-up. That is, he would exert maximal effort up to time
T1 , at which his belief reaches the level α. Faced with such behavior, the best reply of another
(sufficiently patient) agent would be to exert no effort whatsoever; indeed, the value of effort
identified in the symmetric equilibrium is precisely the threshold such that, if an agent expected
his partner to put in more effort than this, he would find it optimal to put in none himself. So
there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which one agent behaves as if he were by himself, and in
which the other agent puts no effort whatsoever. It is not difficult, then, to see that there is
actually an entire continuum of equilibria, of which we have identified the two extreme points.
Each equilibrium is indexed by an agent i = 1, 2, and some time t1 ≤ T1 , such that, up to time t1 ,
agent i chooses maximum effort, while agent −i exerts no effort at all, and from time t1 onward,
given the resulting belief at time t1 , the two agents behave as in the symmetric equilibrium.
In the appendix, we prove that, as long as, as assumed, λ/r ≥ α−1 − p−1 , every equilibrium
is indexed by a collection of nested subsets of agents, {i} ⊂ {i, j} ⊂ {i, j, k} ⊂ · · · ⊂ {1, . . . , n},
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and (not necessarily distinct) times t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn , with t1 ∈ [0, T1 ], tk ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} for
k ≥ 2 (with t1 = T1 ⇒ t2 = · · · = tn = T1 , while t1 < T1 ⇒ tn = ∞), such that agent i exerts
maximal effort by himself up to t1 , agents i, j exert effort as in the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,
ui = uj = r(α−1 − p−1 ) given the resulting p) over the interval (t1 , t2 ], etc.9 The symmetric
equilibrium obtains for t1 = · · · = tn−1 = 0.
Clearly, if agents are sufficiently patient (so that ui,t < λ for all t), the overall payoff of the
team is maximized by the asymmetric equilibrium in which one agent works by himself. So,
according to the utilitarian rule, this asymmetric equilibrium is the best equilibrium and the
symmetric equilibrium is the worst. However, according to the maximin rule, the ranking is
reversed, because the agent who works alone is worse off than in the symmetric equilibrium.
The existence of such an asymmetric equilibrium relies on the strong substitutability conditions that have been assumed so far. As we shall see, if the agents’ efforts display complementarities, such an extreme outcome can no longer occur in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the trade-off
between efficiency and fairness will persist.
The assumption regarding the discount rate was necessary to ensure that the agent’s individual effort characterized in Theorem 1 was less than the maximum effort level λ. If this
assumption is not satisfied, it is possible that both agents exert maximal effort simultaneously,
at least initially. That is, the unique symmetric equilibrium then has the feature that all agents
exert maximal effort up to time t at which, given the resulting belief, the level of effort ui(p), as
defined above the theorem, is equal to λ (since ui (p) → 0 as p → α, this always occurs at some
time t < Tn ). From that point on, agents exert effort at level ui(p), and the qualitative features
of the equilibrium are as before.
So far, agents have been assumed to be identical. If the normalized cost α is the same across
agents, but not necessarily the capacity λi , there is little change in the analysis. In particular,
the symmetric equilibrium remains an equilibrium provided that λi /r ≥ α−1 − p−1 for all agents
i. Similarly, if agents have different discount rates, there is an equilibrium in which all agents
9

Conversely, for any such collection of subsets of agents and switching times, there exists an equilibrium.
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exert interior effort levels, so that the more patient agent i is, the smaller u−i is.
However, the outcome changes dramatically if the normalized cost differs across agents. Indeed, if αi < minj6=i αj (and λi /r ≥ α−1 − p−1 for all i), then, in the unique equilibrium of the
game, agent i behaves as if he were on his own, by exerting maximal effort up to the point at
which the belief p reaches αi . The proof for the case n = 2 is in the appendix. The intuition is
straightforward. Given that agent i has incentives to exert effort for any belief p > αi , but no
other agent has an incentive to exert any effort as soon as p < minj6=i αj , agent i must be the last
agent to exert effort.10 At that point, he might as well exert maximum effort. However, consider
the last agent other than i, say j, to exert any effort, and let t be the time at which he is supposed
to stop exerting effort. At time t − dt, agent j has a strict preference for procrastinating. After
all, that last bit of effort could always be exerted later, and given that agent i will be starting
to exert maximum effort in an instant, the probability that he might be able to avoid exerting
this effort altogether is high enough for him to defer. This implies that t = 0; hence, agent i is
always the only one to exert effort.
The same reasoning applies if agents have different prior beliefs p̄i , or if one agent has a
higher value for success. Then the most optimistic, or the most productive agent (say, agent i)
must exert effort all by himself. In particular, if entering the collaboration involved any type of
additional cost for each agent, agent i would never join the team.
Again, this extreme outcome is partly driven by the perfect substitutability in the productivity
of the agents’ efforts. As we shall see, when efforts are imperfect substitutes, both agents work
even when their productivities differ. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that teams involving agents
with skills of a similar kind, but dissimilar levels, are unlikely to be successful.
10

More precisely, it cannot be that limt→∞ pt > αi , because, when the combined efforts of all agents j 6= i
become negligible, agent i has a strict incentive to exert maximum effort. Hence, limt pt = αi , so that, if t is the
smallest solution to pt = minj6=i αj , agent i must be the only agent exerting effort after t.
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4.3

A Comparison with the Observable Case

We now contrast the previous findings with the corresponding results for the case in which
effort is perfectly observable. That is, we assume here that all agents’ efforts are observable,
and that agent i’s choice as to how much effort to exert at time t (hereafter, his effort choice)
may depend on the entire history of effort choices up to time t. Note that the “cooperative,” or
socially optimal solution is the same whether effort choices are observed or not: delay is costly,
so that all work should be carried out as fast as possible; the threshold belief beyond which such
work is unprofitable must be, as before, p = α/n, which is the point at which marginal benefits
of effort to the team are equal to its marginal cost.
Such a continuous-time game involves well-known nontrivial modeling choices. A standard
way to sidestep these choices is to focus on Markov strategies. Here, the obvious state variable is
the belief p. Unlike in the unobservable case, this belief is always commonly held among agents,
even after histories off the equilibrium path.
A strategy for agent i, then, is a map ui : [0, 1] → [0, λ] from possible beliefs p into an
effort choice ui (p), such that (i) ui is left-continuous; and (ii) there is a finite partition of [0, 1]
into intervals of strictly positive length on each of which ui is Lipschitz-continuous. By standard
results, a profile of Markov strategies u(·) uniquely defines a law of motion for the agents’ common
belief p, from which the (expected) payoff given any initial belief p can be computed (cf. Presman
(1990) or Presman and Sonin (1990)). A Markov equilibrium is a profile of Markov strategies
such that, for each agent i, and each belief p, the function ui maximizes i’s payoff given initial
belief p. See, for instance, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) for details. Following standard steps,
agent i’s continuation payoff given p, Vi (p), must satisfy the optimality equation given by, for all
p, and dt > 0, to the second order,
Vi (p) = max {((ui + u−i) pt − ui α) dt + (1 − (r + (ui + u−i )pt ) dt) Vi (pt+dt )}
ui

= max {((ui + u−i ) pt − uiα) dt + (1 − (r + (ui + u−i)pt ) dt) (Vi (p) − (ui + u−i) p (1 − p) Vi′ (p) dt)} .
ui
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Taking limits as dt → 0 yields
0 = max {(ui + u−i) p − uiα − (r + (ui + u−i )p) Vi (p) − (ui + u−i ) p (1 − p) Vi′ (p)} ,
ui

assuming, as will be verified, that V is differentiable. We focus here on a symmetric equilibrium
in which the effort choice is interior. Given that the maximand is linear in ui, its coefficient must
be zero. That is, dropping the agent’s subscript,
p − α − pV (p) − p (1 − p) V ′ (p) = 0,
and since V (α) = 0, the value function is given by
V (p) = p − α + α(1 − p) ln

(1 − p) α
.
(1 − α) p

Plugging back into the optimality equation, and solving for u := ui , all i, we get
r
r
V (p) =
u(p) =
α(n − 1)
α(n − 1)




(1 − p) α
p − α + α(1 − p) ln
.
(1 − α) p

It is standard to verify that the resulting u is the unique equilibrium strategy profile provided
that p is such that u ≤ λ for all p < p. In particular, this is satisfied when, as assumed in
the unobservable case, λ/r ≥ α−1 − p−1 , which we maintain henceforth. In the model without
observability, recall that, in terms of the belief p, the effort is given by u(p) =

r
(α−1
n−1

− p−1 ).

As is clear from these formulas, the eventual belief is the same whether effort is observed or not,
and so aggregate effort over time is the same in both models. However, delay is not.
Theorem 2 In the symmetric Markov equilibrium with observable effort, the equilibrium level
of effort is strictly lower, for all beliefs, than that in the unobservable case.
Thus, fixing a belief, the instantaneous equilibrium level of effort is lower when previous
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choices are observable, and so is the welfare. This means that delay is greater under observability.
While this may be a little surprising, it is an immediate consequence of the fact that effort
choices are strategic substitutes. Because effort is increasing in the common belief, and because
a reduction in one agent’s effort choice leads to a lower rate of decrease in the common belief,
such a reduction leads to a greater level of effort by other agents. That is, to some extent, the
other agents take up the slack. This depresses the incentives to exert effort and leads to lower
equilibrium levels. This cannot happen when effort is unobservable, because an agent cannot
induce the other agents into exerting the effort for him. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship. As
can be seen from the right panel, a lower level of effort for every value of the belief p does not
imply a lower level of effort for every time t: given that the total effort over the infinite horizon
is the same in both models, levels of effort are eventually higher in the observable case.
The individual payoff is independent of the number of agents n ≥ 2 in the team in the
observable case. This is a familiar rent-dissipation result: when the size of the team increases,
agents waste in additional delay what they save in individual cost. This can be seen directly
from the formula for the level of effort, in that the total effort of all agents but i is independent
of n. It is worth pointing out that this is not true in the unobservable case. This is one example
in which the formula that gives the effort as a function of the common belief is misleading in
the unobservable case: given p, the total instantaneous effort of all agents but i is independent
of n here as well. Yet the value of p is not a function of the player’s information only: it is the
common belief about the unobserved past total efforts, including i’s effort; hence, it depends on
the number of agents. As we have seen, welfare is actually increasing in the number of agents in
the unobservable case. The comparison is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.
In the observable case, there also exist asymmetric Markov equilibria, similar to those described in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), in which agents “take turns” at exerting effort. In
these Markovian equilibria, the “switching points” are defined in terms of the common belief.
Because effort is observable, if agent i procrastinates, this “freezes” the common belief and
therefore postpones the time of switching until agent i makes up for the wasted time. So, the
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Parameter Values: α=1/4, p0=3/4, r=1/20

Parameter Values: α=1/4, p =3/4, r=1/4, n=2
0

0.64

1

Individual Equilibrium Effort

Equilibrium Payoffs

0.63
0.62
0.61

Unobservable
0.6

Observable
0.59
0.58
0.57
0.56
0.55

0.9

Team Solution

0.8

0.7

0.6

Unobservable
0.5

0.4

Observable

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.54
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Time

Number of Agents

Figure 3: Welfare and effort in the observable vs. non-observable case
punishment for procrastination is automatic. Taking turns is impossible without observability.
Suppose that agent i is expected to exert effort alone up to time t, while another agent j exerts effort alone during some time interval starting at time t. Any agent working alone must
be exerting maximal effort, if at all, because of discounting. Because any deviation by agent i
is not observable, agent j will start exerting effort at time t no matter what. It follows that,
at a time earlier than but close enough to t, agent i can procrastinate, wait for the time t′ at
which agent j will stop, and only then, if necessary, make up for this foregone effort (t′ is finite
because j exerts maximal effort). This alternative strategy is a profitable deviation for i if he
is patient enough, because the induced probability that the postponed effort will not be exerted
more than offsets the loss in value due to discounting. Therefore, such switching is impossible
without observability, independently of the agents’ discount rate.
In the observable case, there exist other, non-Markovian symmetric equilibria. As mentioned
above, appropriate concepts of equilibrium have been defined carefully elsewhere (see, for instance, Bergin and McLeod (1993)). It is not difficult to see how one can define formally a
“grim-trigger” equilibrium, for low enough discount rates, in which all agents exert effort at a
maximal rate until time T1 at which p = α, and if there is a unilateral deviation by agent i, all
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other agents stop exerting effort, leaving agent i with no choice but to exert effort at a maximal
rate from this point on until the common belief reaches α. While this equilibrium is not firstbest, it clearly does better than the Markovian equilibrium in the observable case, and than the
symmetric equilibrium in the unobservable case.11
Which equilibrium is more likely to emerge? As a simple application, we reconsider the data
that was used by Ellison (2002). This data, as mentioned above, corroborates one of our main
findings: as the number of coauthors increases, the time lag between submission and acceptance
of the paper increases. As a rudimentary measure of observability, we consider, for each paper,
the number of coauthors affiliated with the same department. The underlying assumption is that
it is easier to monitor effort when coauthors are physically close; hence, we view papers written
by several authors from the same department as being projects with observable levels of effort,
and papers written by distant coauthors as projects with unobservable levels of effort. As Table
1 illustrates, the difference between these two kinds of papers is striking: an additional coauthor
increases the time lag by a month on average; however, it actually increases it by one month
and a half if the coauthors are geographically distant, while it reduces the time lag by two weeks
when they are neighbors. Both results are statistically significant. On one hand, this reinforces
the main conclusion of the unobservable case. On the other hand, this is suggestive evidence that
coauthors in the same department do not follow the prescription of the Markovian equilibrium.
The grim-trigger equilibrium, for instance, is consistent with the data. Delay is decreasing in the
number of coauthors, because coauthors exert effort at a maximal rate. Therefore, increasing
the number of authors increases the total amount of effort exerted at any instant.
It would be interesting to examine whether the quality of monitoring affects the amount of
effort that is exerted, in addition to the delay. The acceptance rate could be used as a proxy
variable. Unfortunately, the data is not suited for such an analysis, because it is restricted to
papers that were accepted eventually.
11

It is tempting to consider grim-trigger strategy profiles in which agents exert effort for beliefs below α. We
ignore them here, because such strategy profiles cannot be limits of equilibria of discretized versions of the game.
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Table 1: Submit-Accept Time Regressions
(1)
(2)
Submit-accept time
Submit-accept time
Total number of
28.970**
46.430***
authors
[14.232]
[15.511]
Number of coauthors
in the same department

-61.156**
[26.032]

Journal dummies

Yes

Yes

Journal trends

Yes

Yes

Field dummies
Observations

Yes
1393

Yes
1393

Note: The dependent variable is the length of time between submission of a paper to
a journal and its acceptance in days. The sample is a subset of the set of papers published in the top five or six general-interest economics journals between 1990 and 1998.
The total number of authors ranges from 1 to 3. All regressions include journal dummies, journal-specific linear time trends, dummies for 17 fields of economics, and all
the control variables used by Ellison (2002) in Table 6. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets (∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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5

Deadlines and Other Mechanisms
In the absence of any kind of commitment, the equilibrium outcome described above seems

inevitable. Pleas and appeals to cooperate are given no heed and deadlines are disregarded. In
this section, we examine what can be done to improve upon this outcome. Three mechanisms
are considered.
The first mechanism is a self-imposed time-limit. We assume that agents can commit to a
deadline and that they choose the optimal deadline such that, if no breakthrough has occurred
by this time, all agents stop exerting effort and the project is abandoned. Effectively, this is
equivalent to considering the game with a finite horizon. We examine which is the optimal
horizon.
A deadline is an extreme version of a symmetric reward scheme, in which the entire surplus is
shared evenly if a breakthrough obtains before the deadline expires, but is completely destroyed
afterwards. In the second mechanism, agents can commit to any symmetric reward scheme (as
a function of time) they wish to, but the scheme has to be ex ante budget-balanced. Clearly,
this must at least weakly improve on a deadline, and we show that, in fact, a deadline is not the
optimal mechanism satisfying ex ante budget balance; it is the optimal mechanism satisfying ex
post budget balance.
Finally, we contrast this “team” reward scheme with the one that a principal who reaps the
benefits of the project would wish to implement. Here as well, because the identity of the actual
agent responsible for the breakthrough is not observed, attention is restricted to symmetric
schemes in which the principal promises the same reward to all agents, but this reward is allowed
to depend on time.
In this section, we normalize the capacity λ to 1.
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5.1

Deadlines

For some possibly infinite deadline T ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, and some strategy profile (u1 , . . . , un ) :

[0, T ] → [0, 1]n , agent i’s (expected) payoff over the horizon [0, T ] is now defined as
r

Z

0

T

(pt (ui,t + u−i,t) − αui,t) e−

Rt
0

(ps (ui,s +u−i,s )+r)ds

dt.

That is, if time T arrives and no breakthrough has occurred, the continuation payoff of the agents
is nil. The baseline model of Section 4 is the special case in which T = ∞. The next lemma,
which we prove in the appendix, describes the symmetric equilibrium for T < ∞. Throughout
this subsection, we maintain the restriction on the discount rate r, given by (4), that we imposed
in Section 4.2.
Lemma 2 Given T < ∞, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, characterized by T̃ ∈
[0, T ), in which the level of effort is given by
ui,t = u∗i,t for t < T̃ , and ui,t = 1 for t ∈ [T̃ , T ],
where u∗i is as in Theorem 1. The time T̃ is non-decreasing in the parameter T and strictly
increasing for T large enough. Moreover, the belief at time T strictly exceeds α.
See Figure 4. According to Lemma 2, effort is first decreasing over time, and over this time
interval, it is equal to its value when the deadline is infinite. At that point, the deadline is far
enough in the future not to affect the agents’ incentives. However, at some point, the deadline
looms large above the agents. Agents recognize that the deadline is near and exert maximal
effort from then on. But it is then too late to catch up with the aggregate effort exerted in
the infinite-horizon case, and pT > α. By waiting until time T̃ , agents take a chance. It is
not difficult to see that the eventual belief pT must strictly exceed α: if the deadline were not
binding, each agent would prefer to procrastinate at instant T̃ , given that all agents then exert
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Figure 4: Optimal strategies given a deadline of T = 3
maximal effort until the end.
Figure 4 also shows the effort level in the symmetric Markov equilibrium with observable effort
in the presence of a deadline (a Markov strategy is now a function of the remaining time and
the public belief). The analysis of this case can be found in the appendix. With a long enough
deadline, equilibrium effort in the observable case can be divided into three phases. Initially,
effort is low and declining. Then, at some point, effort stops altogether. Finally, effort jumps
back up to the maximal level. The last phase can be understood as in the unobservable case; the
penultimate one is a stark manifestation of the incentives to procrastinate under observability.
Note, however, that the time at which effort jumps back up to the maximal level is a function
of the remaining time and the belief, and the latter depends on the history of effort so far. As
a result, this occurs earlier under observability than non-observability. Therefore, effort levels
between the two scenarios cannot be compared pointwise, although the belief as the deadline
expires is higher in the observable case (i.e., aggregate effort exerted is lower).
The next theorem establishes that it is in the agents’ best interest to fix such a deadline. That
is, agents gain from restricting the set of strategies that they can choose from. Furthermore, the
deadline is set precisely in order that agents will have strong incentives throughout.
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Theorem 3 The optimal deadline T is finite and is given by
T =

(n − α)p
1
ln
.
n + r α(n − p) − r(p − α)

It is the longest time for which it is optimal for all agents to exert effort at a maximal rate
throughout.
Note that the deadline is decreasing in n, because it is the product of two positive and
decreasing functions of n. That is, tighter deadlines need to be set when teams are larger. This
is a consequence of the stronger incentives to shirk in larger teams. Furthermore nT decreases
in n as well. That is, the total amount of experimentation is lower in larger teams. However, it
is easy to verify that the agent’s payoff is increasing in the team size. Larger teams are bad in
terms of overall efficiency, but good in terms of individual payoffs.
In the appendix, it is also shown that T is increasing in r: the more impatient the agents, the
longer the optimal deadline. This should not come as a surprise, because it is easier to induce
agents who have a greater level of impatience to work longer.
One might suspect that the extreme features of the equilibrium effort pattern in presence of
a deadline is driven by the linearity in the cost function. Indeed, as was reported in the last
section, the path of equilibrium effort appears to be continuous over time when the cost function
is quadratic. Nevertheless, a deadline provides additional incentives to exert effort when time is
running short, and the graph of the level of effort is U-shaped in a variety of circumstances.12

5.2

The Optimal Budget-Balanced Mechanism

The setting of a deadline is a rather extreme way in which the team can affect incentives. We
now consider a more general class of mechanisms. Agents can commit to a common wage that is
12

Readers have pointed out to us that this effort pattern in the presence of a deadline reminds them of their
own behavior as a single author. Sadly, it appears that such behavior is hopelessly suboptimal for n = 1. We
refer to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for a behavioral model with which they might identify.
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an arbitrary function of time. In the case of a breakthrough, each agent collects this wage. The
budget is required to be balanced on average, given that the project is worth v = n to the team
(because success is a public good that yields a benefit of 1 to each of the n agents, its value v
equals n).
Therefore the agents choose w : R+ → R+ , which is measurable, so as to maximize
r

Z

∞
0

npt ut (nwt − nα) e−

Rt

0 (nps us +r)ds

dt,

subject to there being an ex ante budget balance, namely,
r

Z

∞
0

npt ut (v − nwt ) e−

Rt

0 (nps us +r)ds

dt = 0.

The function u := ui : R+ → [0, 1], which is measurable, must maximize
r

Z

0

∞

(pt (ui,t + u−i,t )wt − αui,t ) e−

Rt

0 (ps (ui,t +u−i,t )+r)ds

dt,

where u−i := (n − 1)u, because agents choose the level of effort that they will exert noncooperatively. We find that fixing a constant wage is not optimal, and neither is fixing a deadline, in the
sense described above (i.e. fixing a constant wage up to some time-limit, after which the wage is
set to zero). To state the next theorem, it is necessary to introduce some notation. Let
p
δ :=
2n(1 − p)

r

1−p
2
(v/α − 1) − (n − 1) ,
(n − 1) + 4n
p

and


α
−r/n
2
.
p (r + n (n − 1)) − r + (nr (1 − p) δ − (n − 1) p (n − r)) δ
w(δ) :=
pr (n − r)
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Finally, let
wt∗ = w(δ)ert + α

r(1 − p) nt
n−1+r
(1 − ert ) − α
(e − ert ).
r
(n − r)p

Theorem 4 The optimal wage scheme w is given by
wt = wt∗ for t ≤ T̂ , and wt = 0 for t > T̂ ,
for some T̂ , such that ut = 1 until time T̂ , and ut = 0 thereafter.13
The final time T̂ cannot be solved in closed-form, and is the unique strictly positive solution
to
v
nr 1 − p̄ nT̂ nT̂
r
( − 1)(e(n+r)T̂ − 1) − (n − 1)enT̂ (erT̂ − 1) −
e (e − erT̂ ) = 0.
n+r α
n − r p̄
This theorem is proved in the appendix, where it is further shown that, at least for small enough
discount rates, the belief at the final time T̂ is above the asymptotic belief in the baseline
model. Thus, if agents are patient enough, the optimal mechanism helps to alleviate the freerider problem, but does not bring the total effort back to its efficient level. As is the case with
a deadline, it is optimal to have agents exert maximal effort until effort stops completely. For
low discount rates, the wage is decreasing over time: frontloading payments allows to incentivize
agents, because the shrinking wage counteracts the incentive to procrastinate. Frontloading
cannot be achieved with a deadline; hence, maximal effort is sustained here over a longer horizon,
as T̂ > T .
This analysis supports the relevance of staggered prizes in the design of scientific competitions.
Such degressive rewards are implemented, among others, by the X Prize foundation (in, for
example, the design of the Google Lunar X Prize).
13

Clearly, the choice of wt for t > T ∗ is to a large extent arbitrary.
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5.3

The Principal Agent Problem

Up to this point, attention has been on what the team could do to help itself. Now, we
consider the problem from the perspective of a principal who designs the payment that the agent
or agents receive (the analysis that follows holds for all n ≥ 1). As mentioned, we restrict
attention to symmetric schemes. Given that it is clear that the principal cannot benefit from
paying wages to unsuccessful agents, such a scheme can be summarized by a wage schedule wt ,
with the interpretation that each agent receives wt if the project gets completed at time t (as will
be clear, agents do not gain by delaying the announcement of a breakthrough). The principal
can commit to any wage path he would like to.
The project is worth v to the principal, who chooses w : R+ → R+ , which is measurable, so
as to maximize
r

Z

∞
0

npt ut (v − nwt ) e−

Rt
0

(nps us +r)ds

dt.

The function u := ui : R+ → [0, 1], which is measurable, maximizes
r

Z

0

∞

(pt (ui,t + u−i,t )wt − αui,t ) e−

Rt

0 (ps (ui,t +u−i,t )+r)ds

dt.

Indeed, observe that a breakthrough arrives at rate ui + u−i = nu, and that the total wage bill
is nwt . Given that an agent can only be provided with a sufficient incentive to exert effort if
the marginal benefit, pw, covers the marginal cost, α, and given that the principal’s mark-up
in case of a breakthrough is v − nw, there is no scope for a profitable scheme if v ≤ nα/p.
Conversely, whenever v > nα/p, the principal may always design some wage scheme that is
profitable, because fixing a constant wage that is equal to the average of v/n and α/p is feasible.
Theorem 5 The optimal wage scheme w is given by
wt = wt∗ for t ≤ T ∗ , and wt = 0 for t > T ∗ ,
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which is such that ut = 1 until time T ∗ :=

1
n

ln δ < T̂ , and ut = 0 thereafter.14

Observe that the principal’s wage scheme follows the same dynamics as the wage scheme that
is optimal for the team. For both problems, it is optimal to induce maximal effort as cheaply
as possible, as long as any effort is worthwhile, but effort stops being worthwhile earlier for the
monopolist.
In the principal’s problem, the wage dynamics must offset the free-riding incentives. The
principal must concede some rents to the agents to induce them to work early. This is easier
when agents are impatient (the wage decreases in r), and more difficult when they are more
agents. In fact, the principal’s payoff is decreasing in the number of agents: a larger team means
more effort early, but the cost in terms of additional rents more than offsets this benefit. In
fact, the maximal amount of total effort produced (nT ∗ = ln δ) is decreasing in the number
of agents: the larger the team, the less the principal is willing to experiment. Again, this can
be easily understood in terms of the familiar trade-off faced by a monopolist, who must trade
off lower output against lower rents. Observe that this amount of effort is independent of the
discount rate. While discounting affects the rents, it also affects the cost of providing this rent,
and because the principal and the agents have the same discount rate, these effects cancel out.
As the discount rate r tends to zero, the wage approaches the affine function w(δ)−αt (n − 1),


n−1
where w(δ) := α 1 + 1−p
δ
+
ln
δ
. To provide incentives when agents are perfectly patient,
p
n

the wage must decay at the rate of the marginal cost (or be constant when n = 1).

Figure 5 illustrates how the wage scheme varies with the parameters. Effort stops when
pt wt = α, or wt = pt /α. Note that this time is independent of the discount rate, as is already
clear from the formula for δ. This means that the total amount of effort is independent of the
discount rate, and so is efficiency. On the other hand, the amount of effort varies with the size of
the group. As is easy to verify, the value of δ is decreasing in n: the larger the group, the higher
the aggregate effort. However, the principal’s payoff need not increase in n. Smaller groups are
14

Here as well, the choice of wt for t > T ∗ is to a large extent arbitrary.

36

typically better, because it is less costly to overcome the incentive to free-ride.
Parameter Values: α=1/4, p =9/10, v=1, n=2
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Figure 5: Optimal wages
One might wonder whether total effort is lower under an output-restricting, but sophisticated
principal, or under a mechanism as imperfect as a self-imposed deadline. It is shown in the
appendix that, when v = n, so that the comparison is meaningful, and the discount rate is
sufficiently low, T P ≤ T : a principal stops the project before the optimal deadline. Clearly,
agents are then worse off.

6

Synergies
Social psychology stresses the role of synergies as an important factor in team success, and

Alchian and Demsetz (1972) emphasized their importance for moral hazard in teams. Among
the many kinds of possible synergies, we focus here on two extreme versions. In the first case,
agents are more effective when working together than working when separately. That is, the
rate at which a success arrives if the project is good displays complementarities in their effort
choices. In the second case, in which attention is restricted to two agents, agents have different
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skills, so that, depending on the type of project, one skill, the other, both or neither might be
appropriate.

6.1

Complementarities

In this subsection, we assume that the instantaneous probability of a breakthrough, conditional on the project being good, is given by
X ρ
f (u1, . . . , un ) = (
ui )1/ρ , where ρ ∈ (0, 1),
i

and, as before, capacity λ is normalized to 1. The instantaneous rate of arrival of a success in
case the project is good has the property of constant elasticity of substitution with respect to the
agents’ levels of effort.15 The assumption that ρ is positive guarantees that limu−i →0 fi (ui, u−i ) >
0 for all ui > 0, where fi = ∂f /∂ui .16 The baseline model corresponds to the special case ρ = 1.
Agents are assumed to be identical for now (αi = α). We assume that the discount rate satisfies
1

(n − 1)r

−1

≥α

−1

n1− ρ
> 0.
−
p

Due to the fact that limui →0 fi (ui , u−i) = ∞ for all u−i > 0, it is no longer possible that,
in equilibrium, some agents exert no effort whatsoever while some other agents exert effort.
No matter what the other agents do, the returns from some sufficiently small amount of effort
are arbitrarily large. As we shall see, this does not imply that the equilibrium is necessarily
symmetric.
This specification captures the notion that by working together, agents are more productive
than by themselves. Indeed, observe that, in the team problem in which agents work coopera15

Of course, there are many other technologies with the property that levels of effort are imperfect substitutes
(for example f (u) = δ min {ui } + (1 − δ) maxj6=i {uj }). The C.E.S. function provides the clearest comparison
with the baseline model, as shown in Theorem 6.
16
Otherwise, there always exist trivial equilibria in which no agent exerts any effort.
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1

tively, it is optimal to set ui = 1 for all i, so that f (ui, . . . , un ) = n ρ , up to the time at which the
1

common belief drops to the level n− ρ α. That is, there is strictly more experimentation here than
in i’s single-decision problem (i.e., when u−i = 0). In this case, the instantaneous probability of
success is equal to ui , as in the baseline case, and effort is only exerted at a maximal rate up to
the time at which the common belief reaches the threshold α.
As in our baseline case, it is more convenient to represent the equilibrium level of effort in
terms of the common equilibrium belief at that time. However, recall that effort is not observable,
and that effort is a function of time only, while the common belief is a function of time and effort,
which can be derived from the equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 6 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which the level of effort exerted at
time t is given by
r
ui (pt ) = u(pt ) :=
n−1

1

n1− ρ
α−1 −
pt

!

,

given the equilibrium value of pt . Effort is positive and strictly decreasing, tending to 0 as t → ∞.
This result generalizes Theorem 1 in the natural way. With synergies as well, free-riding leads
1

to delay and effort dwindles over time. The belief pt converges to n1− ρ α, which corresponds,
here as well, to the effort exerted in the team problem when the prize is divided by n. Observe
that this belief is no longer equal to the threshold in the single-player decision problem. As
mentioned above, in the single-player decision problem, effort is exerted up to the point at which
1

the belief is equal to α. Given that α > n1− ρ α, aggregate equilibrium effort is higher with
synergies and tends to the efficient level as the parameter ρ tends to zero. The threshold at
1

which effort asymptotically stops, n1− ρ α, is decreasing in n, unlike in the case without synergies
in which it was constant. Provided that the belief is low enough, effort is greater with more
agents, although not compared to the first-best level.
It is easy to derive the corresponding symmetric Markovian equilibrium in the observable
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case. The equilibrium effort is given by
r
ui (p) =
(n − 1) α



α
α
p 1 − α/kn
p−
,
− (1 − p) ln
kn kn
1 − p α/kn

1

where kn := n ρ −1 , which gives rise to the same asymptotic threshold as in the non-observable
case. It is easy to verify, as in Theorem 2, that the effort exerted is less than in the non-observable
case, for any given degree of belief.
To discuss the asymmetric equilibria, it is simpler to assume that n = 2, an assumption
that is maintained throughout this subsection. As mentioned above, synergies ensure that there
cannot be an equilibrium in which some agent does not exert any effort at all, while his partner
does. However, they might exert different levels of effort. To describe the asymmetric equilibria,
define the function

1

(σ ρ + 1)2− ρ
.
g(σ) := 2ρ−1
σ
+1

It is easy to verify that this function is strictly increasing for ρ > 1/2, so that its inverse function,
g −1 , is well-defined and increasing as well. Without loss of generality, assume that u1,0 ≥ u2,0 ,
i.e. agent 1 exerts at least as much effort as agent 2 at the initial instant.
Theorem 7 For ρ < 1/2, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium. For ρ ≥ 1/2, there exists a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Each asymmetric equilibrium is uniquely identified by the
value of u1,0 /u2,0 , which is in (1, g −1 (p/α)] if ρ > 1/2, and is unrestricted for ρ = 1/2.
The symmetric equilibrium corresponds to the special case in which u1,0 /u2,0 = 1. In the proof
in the appendix, we further show that the aggregate effort is strictly lower in any asymmetric
equilibrium than in the symmetric equilibrium for ρ > 1/2, and equal to it for ρ = 1/2. Agents
stop exerting effort at the same finite time if ρ = 1/2, but never stop if ρ > 1/2. The roles of
agents are never reversed: because agent 1 exerts more effort than agent 2 at the initial time, he
keeps on exerting more effort throughout. Figure 6 displays the range of values of initial ratios
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σ 0 := u1,0 /u2,0 for which an asymmetric equilibrium exists, for a given prior p0 = p and a level
of complementarity ρ.
Parameter Values: α=0.5, p0∈{0.35,0.4,0.45}
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Figure 6: Admissible initial values for asymmetric equilibria
As in the baseline model, there is a trade-off between efficiency and fairness: it is always best
for the team’s aggregate payoff if the team members’ choices about how much effort to exert
are, to a certain extent, asymmetrical when synergies are not too strong. However, as one would
expect, simulations show that the optimal degree of asymmetry decreases as the strength of the
synergies increases.
What if agents have different costs? Suppose that α1 < α2 , so that agent 1 is more efficient.
There exists a continuum of equilibria, indexed by the initial ratio of effort levels, σ 0 = u1,0 /u2,0 ,
which uniquely defines the equilibrium path. (Depending on p, there might be a bound on
the admissible values of σ 0 . The appendix contains a more formal discussion.) The equilibrium
trajectories of effort can be decomposed into two time intervals. Initially, the more efficient agent
works more than his counterpart. Afterwards, the opposite is true. Depending on the initial value
of σ 0 , one or the other interval might be empty. This ordering of roles can be understood in
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terms of the agents’ relative incentives to procrastinate. The more inefficient agent stands to
lose less by procrastinating (the project is worth less to him, and so discounting his value is less
costly), and has more to gain (effort being costlier for him, he appreciates more the potential
cost saving from procrastination). Therefore, if agents must “take turns,” he must be the second
agent.
The total amount of experimentation, as measured by the limit value of the belief p, is
maximized when the more efficient agent works more throughout; more precisely, he must work
sufficiently more for the ratio σ to reach asymptotically (α2 /α1 )1/(1−ρ) , as the common belief
p tends to its limiting value α2 ((α2 /α1 )ρ/(1−ρ) + 1)1−1/ρ . This means that, not only are there
asymmetric equilibria that tend to the symmetric equilibrium as α2 → α1 , but this is in particular
the case for the equilibrium that maximizes the amount of experimentation. Moreover, this
statement does not depend on the value parameter ρ. Therefore, the discontinuity between
equilibria of the baseline model with symmetric and asymmetric players is not robust to the
introduction of (an arbitrarily small level of) complementarities. The two panels of Figure 7
illustrate how the respective efforts might vary with the initial value σ 0 .
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Figure 7: Equilibria when α1 6= α2 .
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0.6

0.7

6.2

Different Skills

In this subsection, the baseline model is generalized as follows. Instead of the project’s being
simply good or bad, it may be any of four possible types. (1) It is good (type 0), and both agents
are equally able to achieve a breakthrough, as before. In this case, we maintain the assumption
that the arrival rate of a breakthrough has instantaneous probability u1,t + u2,t . (2 and 3) It
is of type i = 1, 2, in which case only agent i’s effort might lead to a breakthrough. That is,
the instantaneous probability of a breakthrough is now ui,t, independently of u−i,t. (4) It is bad
(type 3), and efforts are then wasted, because breakthroughs are impossible.
The initial belief is now given by a vector p = (p0 , p1 , p2 ), where pk is the initial belief that
the project is of type k. More generally, we write pkt for the equilibrium belief at time t that
the project is of type k, so that p3t = 1 − p0t − p1t − p2t , and we assume that p3 > 0.17 Let
u0 := u1 + u2 , u3 := 0. Using Bayes’ rule, it is readily verified that, for k = 0, . . . , 3,
k

k

ṗ /p =

3
X
j=0

pj u j − u k .

Agent i seeks to maximize

Vi (p) = r

Z

0

∞

(

3
X
j=0

pjt uj,t − αi ui,t )e−

R t P3
( j=0 pjs uj,s +r)ds
0

dt.

We assume that agents are symmetric, i.e. αi is independent of i. We focus first on the case in
which p1 = p2 .
Observe that it is no longer an equilibrium for only one agent to exert effort throughout the
project. Indeed, if agent i = 1, 2 works by himself, pi will decrease while pj will increase, where
j is the index of the other agent. That is, the absence of a breakthrough leads agent i to become
The case p3 = 0 can be studied independently. In particular, when skills are perfectly negatively correlated
(p = p3 = 0, p1 = p2 = 1/2), as in Klein and Rady (2008), belief and effort remain constant, with a level of
effort equal to r(α−1 − (1/2)−1 ), which is the same effort as in the baseline model for a belief p = 1/2.
17

0
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more pessimistic about his chances of making a breakthrough than agent j. Therefore, at the
point at which it does not pay for i to continue exerting effort on his own, it would still be
profitable for j to exert effort.
It cannot be, either, that one agent works after another agent stops working, because the
agent that remains active would exert maximal effort as soon he was working by himself, say
at time t. Yet the other agent would be unwilling to exert any effort at time t − dt, for small
enough dt > 0. So when one agent works, both must work, and if they are patient enough, the
unique solution for equilibrium effort is symmetric and interior. The restriction on the discount
rate and on the parameters must be changed to
r −1 ≥ α−1 −

1
1 − p3


−1/2 !
0
3
p (1 − p )
1+ 1+
> 0,
p1 p2

which is assumed here. If the second inequality fails, effort is identically zero in every equilibrium.
As stated, the problem is multidimensional. However, it turns out that it can be solved
explicitly and that, on the equilibrium path, effort only depends on p3 . To state the result, we
define

p
1
−
2C
−
2α(1
−
C)
+
1 − 4α(1 − α)(1 − C)
p0 p3
C :=
.
, and p̃3 :=
1
2
2(1 − C)
p p

Theorem 8 Assume p1 = p2 > 0. There exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. In
this equilibrium, at time t, given the equilibrium value of p3t , agents exert a level of effort equal
to
ui (p3t )

=

u(p3t )

r
:=
α


1−



α
3
3 −1/2
.
1 + (1 + C(1 − pt )/pt )
1 − p3t

Effort is positive for all t ≥ 0, and limt p3t = p̃3 .

The exact relationship between time t and belief p3t is given in the appendix. Given this
result, it would appear that having different skills does not fundamentally change the incentives
of agents to free-ride. As in the baseline model, the equilibrium reflects dilatory behavior. The
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project suffers a protracted delay and effort dwindles over time. Indeed, it follows from the
theorem that limt→∞ ui,t = 0. As the common value p1 = p2 tends to zero, the effort approaches
the symmetric equilibrium from Theorem 1. Therefore, introducing agent-specific skills restores
uniqueness and singles out the symmetric equilibrium in the limit.
Somewhat surprisingly, the limiting threshold p̃3 only depends on the prior belief p via a
one-dimensional statistic, C, in which it is increasing. One extreme case is obtained by taking
p1 = p2 to zero. We are then back to the baseline model, in which the belief 1 − p3 tends to α.

The other extreme case is obtained by taking p0 to zero. Skills are then entirely independent,

yet free-riding persists, because effort is not maximal, and 1 − p3 tends to a higher threshold,
2α, which reflects the lower probability that a particular agent’s skill is the appropriate one.
If one agent is more likely to solve the problem that the other, in the sense that p1 > p2 ,
say, the equilibrium is unique as well. As we show in the appendix, along the equilibrium path,
the more “optimistic” agent (agent 1, here), starts by exerting maximal effort by himself, up
to the point at which p1 = p2 (recall that p1 will decrease and p2 will increase), provided that
the resulting p3 is still lower than p̃3 (otherwise, agent 1 stops at some point, and neither agent
works thereafter). From that point on, both agents work symmetrically, as a function of p3 , as
described in Theorem 8.
As we show in the appendix, the belief p̃3 has a natural interpretation. In the team problem
in which agents behave cooperatively, if a breakthrough is worth 1/2 to each agent, rather than
1, the optimal strategy profile calls for both agents to exert maximal effort up to the time t
at which p3t = p̃3 . This means that, as in the baseline model, the effect of free-riding can be
decomposed into two components: (i) it affects the total exertion of effort in the usual way (p̃3
falls short of the cooperative threshold); and (ii) it also affects the timing of this exertion, as
described above. Figure 8 below illustrates the pattern of effort and belief over time.
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Parameter Values: α=1/3, r=1/20, p =1/5, p =1/5
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Figure 8: Effort and beliefs with synergies

7

Multitask Projects
So far, we have presented a project as consisting of a single breakthrough. This is a gross

simplification. Most projects involve several steps, or tasks, each of which must be completed for
the project to be a success. In this section, we adapt some of our earlier findings to the design
of optimal collaborations in the case of multiple tasks. For simplicity, we restrict attention to
the case of two tasks. In addition, given that the information structure is no longer trivial, we
require strategies to be sequentially rational. At any time, agents now observe whether a task
has been already (successfully) completed, which task it was, and at what time it was completed.
Neither the level nor the allocation of effort is observed. We also assume that if both agents
work on one task simultaneously and the task gets completed at that instant, the specific agent
that is responsible for the success cannot be identified.18
The literature on project design has emphasized the relevance of the type of task for the
18

This is not to say that the other case is uninteresting or intractable, but for the sake of concision, one or the
other modeling choice had to be made.
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effect of social loafing. Particular attention is devoted to the distinction between: conjunctive
tasks, all of which must be completed for the project to be a success; disjunctive tasks, only of
which must be completed to guarantee the success of the team (and completing any further task
provides no further benefit); and additive tasks, for which the value of the project is additive in
the completion of the tasks (if only one project is completed, it is worth a payoff normalized to
1 to each agent. If both are completed, each agent obtains a payoff of 2.)
Another dimension along which projects vary relates to the timing of tasks. For some projects,
it is possible to work on two tasks simultaneously. For others, however, it is imperative to
complete a specific task before tackling the second one.
As before, we assume that each task is either good or bad. The type of task is statistically
independent across tasks and the initial probability that any given task is good is still denoted by
p. Effort is additively separable across tasks. Agents are assumed to be identical, with marginal
cost α, and the total capacity for effort normalized to 1. We describe here some equilibria. It is
easy to verify that these strategy profiles are indeed equilibria. Proofs are omitted and available
upon request.

7.1

The Team Problem

To understand the agents’ incentives better, it is useful to start with the case in which there
is only one agent (or, equivalently, in which agents act cooperatively). The following result holds
for all discount rates r ≥ 0. In all cases, effort is exerted at the maximal rate until some point
at which effort stops altogether. Our focus is on the allocation of effort across tasks, so we omit
a discussion of these stopping times. The next proposition describes the optimal sequencing.
Proposition 1 (The Team solution) If n = 1, it is optimal to:
1. Work sequentially on tasks if they are conjunctive. If the prior probability p of each task
being good is identical across tasks, it is better to start with the task for which the parameter
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α is higher. If the cost parameter α is the same, it is better to start with the task for which
p is lower.
2. Split work equally across tasks if they are disjunctive and identical. If they are not identical,
effort must be devoted exclusively to the task for which the difference p − α is larger, until
these differences are equalized, after which effort must be split so as to maintain these
differences equal.
3. Tackle the tasks in any order, if tasks are additive and r = 0. If r > 0, effort with additive
tasks should be allocated as in the disjunctive case.
The first conclusion might first sound a little surprising. However, recall that all conjunctive
tasks must be completed for the project to be successful. If one task is likely to be impossible to
complete, either because agents are quite pessimistic about it (low p) or because it is demanding
(high α), then it makes sense to avoid wasting effort on the “easier” task by postponing tackling
it until it has been determined whether or not the more difficult task can be completed.19
If tasks are disjunctive, on the other hand, it makes sense to devote the effort to whichever
task yields the higher immediate return, that is, the task for which the spread p − α is larger.
This also holds for the additive case, but only because agents are impatient. Otherwise, since
tasks are independent, the order becomes irrelevant.

7.2

Sequential Conjunctive Tasks

We first consider the case in which task 1 needs to be completed in order to start task 2.
Agents each receive a payoff of 1 if both tasks are completed, and nothing otherwise.
Observe first that, in the single-agent problem with only one task, which is worth v, the
agent would exert maximal effort up to the point at which his belief p would satisfy pv = α, or
p = α/v. That is, increasing the prize has the same effect as decreasing the marginal cost, and if
19
Obviously, the threshold for the first task in the sequential problem is not the threshold α for that task
considered on its own.
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agents had different values for the project, the unique equilibrium would involve the agent with
the higher valuation exerting all the effort.
Next, observe that, in the asymmetric equilibrium of the single-task project in which one
agent exerts effort at a maximal rate and the other agent does not exert any effort at all, the
idle agent has quite obviously a strictly higher payoff.
It follows that, if agent i performs the last task all by himself, his continuation payoff vi , at
the time at which the first task is completed, is strictly lower than the payoff of the other agent,
vj . From the point of view of performing the first task, the second task can be summarized
by the continuation payoffs (v1 , v2 ). Therefore, if agent i performs the last task by himself,
independently of the time at which the first task is successfully completed, it must be that agent
j 6= i is the only one exerting effort on the first task. With two tasks, there is no longer a
trade-off between efficiency and fairness and there exists a unique equilibrium such that the last
task is performed by one agent only.
This reasoning can be extended to multiple tasks. With two tasks left, the agent who performs
the last task has a slightly higher continuation payoff. This is because he will only exert effort if
(and after) the other agent is successful. Therefore, he must be the one working by himself on
the first of the three tasks. This reasoning can obviously be extended to any number of tasks:
there exists a unique equilibrium such that the last task is performed by one agent only; in this
equilibrium, agents alternate in executing tasks, as long as they are successful.

7.3

Conjunctive Tasks

Now consider the case in which the two tasks are conjunctive (i.e., the payoff is awarded only
upon completion of both). However, there are no restrictions on the timing of players’ efforts.
We focus on the case in which players are symmetric and sufficiently patient, and discuss the
following two equilibria.20
20

The specification of the appropriate bound on r is omitted here.
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Proposition 2 (Conjunctive Tasks) If agents are sufficiently patient, the following are purestrategy equilibria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work sequentially, each on one task. Agent 2 begins to work only if, and after, agent
1 has completed the first task successfully .
2. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Agents exert maximal effort until some time
T , at which they stop working. Upon completing a task, an agent stops working, while the
other one keeps on exerting maximal effort up to some time.
In the equilibrium with sequential efforts, beliefs eventually reach the efficient thresholds. In
fact, the first agent works until his beliefs offset the payoff from having the second agent complete
the remaining one. After and if the first agent has completed the task, the second agent works
until the beliefs reach α, because his value from a success is equal to 1. Furthermore, both agents
exert maximal effort, which makes this equilibrium the most efficient noncooperative solution.
The equilibrium with simultaneous work and specialization is supported by the threat that,
if an agent is successful after time T , he is required to work alone on the remaining task, up to
the appropriate thresholds. As agents work, they become increasingly pessimistic about their
partner’s chances of completing the other task. This reduces the value of completing their own
task, so that the belief threshold at which they would stop actually increases over time. This
threshold is reached when α/p equals the expected value from having the other agent work alone
on the remaining task, starting from a belief p. However, if a task gets completed, the remaining
agent works until the usual threshold p = α. Therefore, this equilibrium is less efficient than
the sequential one, purely in terms of total effort (because both individual thresholds increase
over time). The continuation strategy of stopping work after a success is efficient both from an
ex post perspective (because having only agent work on one task is efficient), and from an ex
ante perspective. It is of critical importance that each agent knows that he is alone working
on his task. Otherwise, he would be tempted to wait for the other agent to complete his own
task. Continuation play prescribes the strongest possible punishment for deviating. In fact, if
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the first success is obtained after the time at which both agents were supposed to stop, the
first agent to succeed must also complete the remaining task. This specification is admittedly
extreme, although the equilibrium outcome can also be supported by weaker ones (under stronger
restrictions on the parameters).
Finally, there are also several equilibria with simultaneous and non maximal effort levels.
For instance, agents use the symmetric (baseline) equilibrium strategy on task 1, given the
continuation payoff (which affects the limit threshold) and then, if successful, on task 2.

7.4

Additive Tasks

Now consider the case in which tasks are additive and payoffs are given by the total number
of successes.
Proposition 3 (Additive Tasks) If players are sufficiently patient, the following are purestrategy equilibria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work sequentially, each on one task. Agent 2 begins to work only if, and after, agent
1 has completed his task.
2. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Agents exert effort at the maximal rate
until the single-task threshold p = α is reached. Upon obtaining a success, an agent stops
working, while the other one completes his task.
In the equilibrium in which agents work simultaneously, both agents work until they reach
the single-task threshold, because the value of each success is independent of their beliefs about
other tasks. This also deters an agent from delaying his efforts to until after his partner has
completed his task. Unlike in the case of conjunctive tasks, this equilibrium is more efficient
than the sequential one. In fact, both equilibria involve both agents working until the singleproject threshold, but the sequential one has a longer expected completion time.
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There also exists a symmetric equilibrium without maximal effort. Agents can work on the
two tasks both sequentially or simultaneously. In either case, agents adopt the equilibrium
strategies described in our baseline model with one task. The equilibrium with sequential efforts
requires a minimal level of patience to ensure that agents actually want to wait for one task to
be completed (or abandoned) before starting to work on the other.

7.5

Disjunctive Tasks

Now consider the case in which projects are disjunctive, which means that success in any one
project ends the game with a unit payoff for both agents.
Proposition 4 (Disjunctive Tasks) If agents are sufficiently patient, the following are equilibria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Each agent exerts a lower amount of effort
than in the case of a common single-task project.
2. Agents work simultaneously and divide their efforts equally across tasks.
As in the team problem, agents maintain the spread p − α constant across tasks. In the equilibrium with agents working each on one task, the incentives to procrastinate are stronger than
in our baseline case. By shirking today, an agent “freezes” his beliefs about his task. Exerting
effort tomorrow will therefore be relatively more productive. Analogously, in the equilibrium in
which efforts are divided across tasks, the total amount of effort that is exerted on each task is
lower than in the equilibrium with division of labor. Indeed, suppose that the total amounts of
effort exerted on each task were equal to the case of division of labor. Holding fixed the effort
devoted to one task, each agent would be indifferent between working and not working at all on
the other task, provided his partner does not collaborate on it. Since his partner is now exerting
positive effort on both tasks, each player then has an incentive to free-ride and reduce his effort,
relative to the equilibrium with division of labor.
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8

Concluding Remarks
We have shown that moral hazard distorts not only the amount of effort, but also its timing.

Agents work too little, too late. Downsizing the team might help, provided that agents’ skills
are not too complementary. On the other hand, increasing transparency might aggravate the
delay. Setting an appropriate deadline is beneficial, in as much as the reduction in delay more
than offsets the further reduction in effort.
The model that we have considered is quite stylized, partly for reasons of simplicity, partly
for tractability. We discuss here how relaxing two of the assumptions affects the main results.
Learning-By-Doing: In practice, agents do not only learn from their past effort whether they
can succeed, but also how they can succeed. Such learning-by-doing can be modelled as in
Doraszelski (2003), by assuming that each agent i accumulates knowledge according to
żi,t = ui,t − δzi,t ,
with zi,0 = 0. If the project is good, a breakthrough occurs with instantaneous probability
P
i hi,t , where
φ
hi,t = ui,t + ρzi,t
.

The baseline model obtains if we let δ → ∞, or ρ → 0. While the first-order conditions
given by Pontryagin’s theorem cannot be solved in closed-form, they can be solved numerically.
It is no longer the case that effort is positive forever (at least, if φ is not too large). This
should not be too surprising, because accumulated knowledge is a substitute for actual effort,
so that it serves as its proxy once its stock is sufficiently large relative to the public belief. The
probability of a breakthrough evolves as in the baseline model. It decreases over time, and
remains always positive (which is obvious, since accumulated knowledge never fully depreciates).
Effort decreases continuously and reaches zero in finite time. The asymptotic belief is now lower
than α: although effort may (or may not) stop before this threshold is reached, the belief keeps
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decreasing afterwards, because of the accumulated knowledge. Figure 9 depicts the locus of
beliefs and knowledge stocks at which effort stops, and shows one possible path for the public
belief, from zi,0 = 0 to the point at which all effort stops, for two possible values of φ. The dotted
lines represent the evolution of p and z once effort has stopped. As one would expect, time until
Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=1/φ, φ=1/3
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Figure 9: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of φ
which effort stops grows without bound as we approach the baseline model (i.e., if ρ → 0 or
δ → ∞).
Convex Costs: Throughout the analysis, we have maintained the assumption that the cost
is linear in the level of effort. While this affords tractability, it is natural to ask whether the
findings are robust to this assumption. This is especially relevant given that, with linear cost,
agents are actually indifferent between any level of effort at a symmetric equilibrium, so that
such an equilibrium has the flavor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, for which comparative statics
are sometimes counterintuitive.
While it is no longer possible to obtain closed-form formulas for the solution of the EulerLagrange equations that characterize the interior solution in the case of nonlinear cost, we present
here a few numerical illustrations for the case of cost functions that are power functions, i.e.
c(ui ) = c · uγi , γ > 1, c > 0. We focus here on the case of symmetric agents, and the instantaneous
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probability of a breakthrough is still given by the sum of the efforts. That is, the model is
otherwise identical to the baseline case.
γ

Parameter Values r=2, c(u)=uγ/9, γ∈[2.1, 3.7] p0=.9, n=2
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Figure 10: Cost of delay and payoffs with convex cost
The first remark is that convex costs are similar to synergies, in the sense that, with more
agents, it is possible to achieve the same total level of effort at a lower cost (because dividing
the same total effort across more agents lowers the overall cost, when the cost is convex). This
should favor larger teams, and we might expect that the amount of effort exerted by an agent
does not decrease as quickly, as we increase the number of agents, relative to the baseline model.
In turn, this might lead to the time within which a breakthrough is expected to occur being
reduced (conditional on a breakthrough occurring in finite time) for larger teams, while the
impact on payoff is ambiguous.21 Indeed, this is precisely what we find, provided the convexity
is sufficiently pronounced. See Figure 10 for an illustration of welfare and the cost of delay, and
see the left panel of Figure 11 below, which shows that the effort path becomes flatter as the
convexity becomes stronger (the cost functions have been normalized so that the value of the
single-decision problem remains constant).
The other finding that seems to depend significantly on the linear cost structure is the dis21

Such conditioning is meaningful, since the overall effort over time is still independent of n.
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γ
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Figure 11: Effort with convex cost with or without a deadline
continuity in equilibrium levels of effort when there is a deadline. Indeed, with convex costs, one
suspects that the equilibrium effort should be a continuous function of time. This is indeed the
case, as shown in the right panel of Figure 11. Furthermore, for a deadline that is far enough in
the future, the graph for effort is approximately U-shaped.
Incomplete Information: In many applications, uncertainty pertains not only to the quality
of the project, but also to the productivity of agents. That is, the value of the parameter α of
each agent might be unknown. We may model this by assuming that α ∈ {αL , αH } is drawn
independently across players, with αL < αH , and some probability q0 that each agent is of the
low type αL , that is, that his productivity is high.
Solving for an equilibrium is difficult, because agents are updating on both the quality of
the project and the productivity of their opponent, and this updating depends on the effort
choices, which are private information. While we have not attempted to establish uniqueness,
the following constitutes a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium path (for those values of the
parameters for which the solution is not trivial). The low-type (high-productivity) agent starts
by exerting effort by himself. As time passes, he quickly becomes more pessimistic, while the
high-type agent, who does not work during that time, does not update his belief downward as
fast (the lack of success is not as surprising to him because he does not work). That is, the
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private beliefs of the two agent’s types about the quality of the project diverge. At some time,
the relative optimism of the high-cost agent more than offsets his cost disadvantage and he starts
exerting effort. Simultaneously, the low-cost agent stops working once and for all. The highcost agent’s effort then dwindles over time and his belief converges asymptotically to αH , his
Marshallian threshold. Because of his initial effort level, the private belief of the low-cost agent
remains forever below the high-cost agent’s and converges asymptotically to a level below his
own Marshallian threshold, namely αL . The effort trajectories in such an equilibrium are shown
in Figure 11 below.22
An interesting open question is what happens when effort is observable. Since the level of
effort conveys information about the agent’s type, this might give rise to ratcheting, as low-cost
agents might want to hide their private information. This might further depress the exertion of
effort in the observable case, but a careful analysis is left for future research.
Parameter Values: αL=1/5, αH=1/2, r=1/10, q0=1/2, p0=4/5
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22

Note that effort can be increasing over time. This is due to the fact that, because the probability that agent
−i assigns to agent i being of the low type decreases over time, the effort agent −i needs to exert to keep player
i indifferent between exerting effort or not might actually increase.
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Appendix
A

Proofs for Section 4

P
Proof of Theorem 1: (Preliminaries.) Observe first that, since ṗt = −pt (1 − pt ) i ui,t , we
P
P
have pt i ui,t = −ṗt / (1 − pt ). It follows that pt i ui,t = d log (1 − pt ) /dt. We can then rewrite
Rt P
the discount factor exp(− 0 (ps i ui,s + r)ds) in expression (3) as exp(−rt)(1 − p)/(1 − pt ), and
the objective function as
r

Z




ṗt
1 − p −rt
ṗt
+α
+ u−i,t
e dt,
−
1 − pt
pt (1 − pt )
1 − pt

∞

0

where u−i,t :=

P

j6=i

uj,t. Applying integration by parts to the objective and ignoring all irrelevant

terms (those that do not depend on ui or x), we obtain
Z

0

∞


rα ln

pt
r(α − 1) + αu−i,t
+
1 − pt
1 − pt



e−rt dt.

Making the further change of variable xt = ln ((1 − pt ) /pt ), and defining β := 1/α − 1, agent i
maximizes

Z

0

∞

(−xt + e−xt (u−i,t /r − β))e−rt dt, such that ẋt = ui,t + u−i,t ,

over functions ui,t in [0, λ], given the function u−i,t .
The Hamiltonian for this problem is

H ui,t , xt , γ i,t = (−xt + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β))e−rt + γ̂ i,t (ui,t + u−i,t) .

It is easy to see that no agent exerts effort if pt < α (consider the original objective function:
if pt < α, then choosing ui,t = 0 is clearly optimal). We therefore assume that p > α, which
is equivalent to x0 < ln β, where x0 = ln ((1 − p̄) /p̄). Assumption (4) on the discount rate is
equivalent to 1 + e−x0 (λ/r − β) > 0.
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(Necessary Conditions.) Define γ i,t := γ̂ i,t ert . By Pontryagin’s principle, there must exist a
continuous function γ i such that, for each i,
1. (maximum principle) For each t ≥ 0, ui,t maximizes γ i,t (ui,t + u−i,t );
2. (evolution of the co-state variable) The function γ satisfies γ̇ i,t = rγ t + 1 + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β);
3. (transversality condition) If x∗ is the optimal trajectory, lim γ i,t (x∗t − xt ) ≤ 0 for all feasible
t→∞

trajectories xt .
The transversality condition follows here from Kamihigashi (2001). Since there is a co-state
variable γ i for each player, we are led to consider a phase diagram in Rn+1 , with dimensions
representing γ 1 , ..., γ n , and x.
(Candidate Equilibrium.) We first show that the candidate equilibrium strategy u∗i,t and the
corresponding beliefs function x∗t satisfy the necessary conditions. Consider a strategy generating
a trajectory that starts at (γ 1 , ..., γ n , x0 ) = (0, ..., 0, x0 ), and has ui,t = u∗i,t := r(β − ext ) /(n − 1) .
This implies that γ i,t = 0 along the trajectory. Observe that u∗i,t > 0 as long as xt < ln β, and is
decreasing in t, with limit 0 as t → ∞. Indeed, the solution is
x∗t = ln β − ln(1 + (βe−x0 − 1)e−(n/(n−1) )rβt ).

(8)

This implies u∗i,t = (rβ /(n − 1) ) /((βe−x0 −1)−1 e(n/(n−1) )rβt +1), which corresponds to expression
(7) in the text. Indeed, this trajectory has xt → ln β, and γ ∗i,t = 0, for all t.

(Uniqueness.) We now use the trajectory γ ∗1,t , ..., γ ∗n,t , x∗t as a reference to eliminate other
trajectories, by virtue of the transversality condition. We shall divide all possible paths into
several subsets:
1. Consider paths that start with γ j ≥ 0 for all j, with strict inequality γ i > 0 for some i.
Since γ i > 0, ui = λ, and so γ̇ j > 0 for all j. So we might as well consider the case γ j > 0
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for all j. Then for all j, we have uj > 0 and γ j strictly increasing. It follows that γ 1 , ..., γ n ,
and x all diverge to +∞. Given the reference path along which x converges, such paths
violate the transversality condition.
2. Consider paths that start with γ i ≤ 0 for all i, with strict inequality γ i < 0 for all but one
agent j. We then have u−j = 0. Since p > α implies that rγ j + 1 − βe−x0 < 0, it follows
that γ̇ j < 0, and we might as well assume that γ i < 0 for all i. So we have ui = 0 for
all i, and x remains constant, and all γ i diverge to −∞. Since x0 is less than ln β, the
limit of our reference trajectory, this again violates the transversality condition. The same
argument rules out any path that enters this subset of the state space, provided it does so
for xt < ln β. However, we do not rule out the case of γ = (γ 1 , ..., γ n ) ≤ 0 with two or
more indices j s.t. γ j = 0 and u−j > 0.
3. Consider paths that start with some γ i < 0 for all agents i 6= j, and with γ j > 0. Assume
further that rγ j + 1 − βe−x0 ≥ 0. Because uj > 0, ẋt > 0 and so we might as well assume
that γ̇ j ≥ rγ j + 1 − βe−x0 > 0. It then follows that uj > 0 forever, and so γ j diverges to
+∞, as does x. This again violates the transversality condition. If there is more than one
j such that γ j > 0, then u−j ≥ λ, and 1 + e−x0 (λ/r − β) > 0 implies that a fortiori γ̇ j > 0.
The same argument then applies.
4. Consider paths that start with some γ i < 0 for all i 6= j, and with γ j > 0. Assume further
that rγ j + 1 − βe−x0 < 0. Since uj > 0 as long as γ j > 0, the trajectory must eventually
leave this subset of parameters, either because γ j ≤ 0, and then we are back to case 2, or
because γ̇ j ≥ 0, and then we are back to case 3. If the trajectory enters one of the previous
subsets, it is not admissible for the reasons above. Therefore, the only case left is if this
trajectory hits (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , x) ≤ (0, ..., 0, ln β) with at least two indices j such that γ j = 0.
This is case 5. Notice that if there were more than one index j for which γ j > 0, then
u−j ≥ λ, and 1 + e−x0 (λ/r − β) > 0 would imply γ̇ j > 0 even if rγ j + 1 − βe−x0 < 0,
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bringing us back to case 3.
5. Consider paths that start with (γ 1 , ..., γ n , x) ≤ (0, ..., 0, ln β) with at least two j such that
γ j = 0. Let At = {j : γ j,t = 0}. Then there is a unique solution u∗j,t (|A|) := r(β −
ext ) /(|A| − 1) , such that γ̇ j = 0 for all j ∈ A (as long as xt < ln β, since u∗j,t = 0 when
xt = ln β). Along this trajectory, xt → ln β. Furthermore, the effort levels must switch
to u∗j,t (|At | + 1) for all j ∈ A ∪ {i} whenever γ i = 0 for i 6∈ At . Similarly if two or more
i 6∈ At hit γ i = 0 at the same time. We show this by ruling out all other cases. Any
policy with u−j < u∗−j (|A|) for all j implies γ̇ j < 0, leading to case 2. Any policy with
u−j > u∗−j (|A|) leads to case 1. Finally, any policy different from u∗j (|A|) can lead to two
or more γ j > 0 (case 3), or to a single γ j > 0 (cases 3 and 4). This leaves us with the only
possible scenario, uj = u∗j (|A|) for all j ∈ A, and this is precisely the candidate trajectory
examined earlier.
We have thus eliminated all but one family of paths. These paths start with at most one agent
i exerting ui = λ, then switching (before the beliefs have reached ln β) to two or more agents
(including i) who play the reference strategy u∗i,t (|At |), as if only agents i ∈ At were present in
the team. At any point in time before the beliefs have reached the threshold α, more agents
may be added to A (but not subtracted). In that case, the policy switches to the appropriate
strategy u∗j (|A|). That is, all candidate equilibria have several phases. In the first phase, one
player exerts effort alone. In the subsequent phases, all (active) players exert effort at equal
levels, adding new players at any point in time. Of course, there are extreme cases in which some
phase is non-existent. Therefore, the only symmetric equilibrium is one in which |A0 | = n, that
is, all players exert effort u∗j (n) from the start.
(Sufficiency.) We are left with proving that these candidate equilibria are indeed equilibria.
While the optimization programme described above is not necessarily concave in x, observe that,
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defining qt := pt /(1 − pt ), it is equivalent to
max
ui

Z

∞

(ln qt + qt (

0

u−i,t
− β))e−rt dt s.t. q̇t = −qt (ui,t + u−i,t ).
r

so that the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in q, and sufficiency then follows from the Arrow
sufficiency theorem (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987), Thm. 3.17). Therefore, all these paths
are equilibria.



Proof of Lemma 1: (1.) From expression (7), it is clear that individual effort is decreasing in
t, and that for a fixed t, u∗i,t is increasing in r and p̄.
(2.) Aggregate effort is measured by x∗t , since we know ẋt =

P

i

ui,t . Differentiating expression

(8), it follows that the equilibrium x∗t is decreasing in α and in n, and that limt→∞ x∗t = ln β for
all n.
Given the equilibrium strategies, the probability of a success occurring is given by
Z

∞

f (s) ds =

0

Z

∞

0

s
1
e− 1+kes ds,
s
1 + ke

where s = nrβt/ (n − 1). It is therefore independent of n. Let τ ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} denote the random
time at which a breakthrough arrives. The conditional distribution of arrival times t for a team
of size n is given by
Gn (t) :=

Z

s̃(t,n)

f (s) ds

0

Z

∞

f (s) ds ,

0

where s̃ (t, n) := nrβt/ (n − 1). Since s̃ is decreasing in n, the probability of a success arriving
before time t is also decreasing in n. In other words, the conditional distributions of arrival
times Gn (t) are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. As a consequence, the conditional
expected time of a breakthrough is increasing in n.
(3.) Substituting expressions (8) and (7) for x∗t and u∗i,t , the equilibrium payoffs in (3) can be
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written as
r 2 kβ
V =
(1 + β) (β + 1 + k)

Z

0

∞


1+

β

+

− nrtβ
n−1

1 + ke

βkn /(n − 1)
k+e

nrtβ
n−1



nrtβ

e− n−1 −rt dt,

where k := (βe−x0 − 1). The change of variable y = exp((n /(n − 1) ) rβt) allows us to write the
payoff as
rkβ
V =
(1 + β) (β + 1 + k)



1
1−
n

Z

1

0


y (n−1)/nβ
dy ,
1 + ky

which is increasing in n, since y ∈ [0, 1] implies the integrand is decreasing in n. Furthermore,
the un-normalized payoff is independent of r. The other comparative statics follow upon differentiation of V .



Two-player, asymmetric case: Assume that players are asymmetric, in the sense that α1 <
α2 , which implies ln β 1 > ln β 2 . The nontriviality condition becomes now that p > α1 , while we
maintain the patience assumption 1 + e−x0 (λ/r − β i ) > 0.
(Necessary Conditions.) There must exist a continuous function γ i such that, for each i,
1. ui,t maximizes γ i,t (ui,t + u−i,t ).
2. γ̇ i,t = rγ t + 1 + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β i ).
3. If x∗ is the optimal trajectory, lim γ i,t (x∗t − xt ) ≤ 0 for all feasible trajectories xt .
t→∞

(Candidate Equilibrium.) We consider a phase diagram in R3 , with dimensions γ 1 , γ 2 ,
and x. Consider the trajectory that starts from some (γ 1 , γ 2 , x), with γ 1 > 0, γ 2 < 0 and
γ̇ 1 = rγ 1 + 1 − β 1 e−x < 0 (i.e. it has u1,t = λ and u2,t = 0 to begin with) such that it reaches
(γ̄ 1 , γ̄ 2 , x̄), with γ̄ 1 = 0, γ̄ 2 < 0, γ̇ 1 = γ̇ 2 = 0, and x̄ = ln β 1 . At this point (γ̄ 1 , γ̄ 2 , x̄), ui,t = 0 for
all t, and the trajectory stops.
(Uniqueness.) To prove that this is the unique equilibrium outcome, we divide this space
into several subsets.
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1. Consider any path that starts with γ i > 0, γ j ≥ 0. This case is analogous to case (1) in the
proof of Theorem 1.
2. Consider paths that start with γ i < 0, γ j ≤ 0. There are several subcases, depending on
the initial condition.
(a) rγ k + 1 − β k e−x > 0 for either k = i or j. Then γ k diverges to +∞, and so must x.
This violates the transversality condition.
(b) rγ 2 + 1 − β 2 e−x = 0. Given that x0 < ln β 1 , it follows that γ̇ 1 < 0 (unless possibly
γ 2 = 0 and u2 > 0, in which case, however, ẋ > 0 and so the trajectory immediately
enters the previous subcase). So γ 1 diverges to −∞, and x remains constant at a level
strictly below x. Again, this violates the transversality condition.
(c) rγ 2 + 1 − β 2 e−x < 0. As in the previous case, it follows that γ̇ 1 < 0 (with the same
caveat as before), so γ 1 diverges to −∞, and so does γ 2 ; x remains constant, and
again, the transversality condition is violated.
3. Consider paths that start with γ i < 0, γ j > 0, and rγ j + 1 − β j e−x0 ≥ 0. This case is
analogous to (3.) in the proof of Theorem 1.
4. Consider paths that start with γ i < 0, γ j > 0, rγ j + 1 − β j e−x0 < 0. There are two subcases:
(a) i = 1. Because u2 > 0 as long as γ 2 > 0, so that ẋ > 0, the trajectory must eventually
leave this subset of parameters. Note that it must do so for a value of x no larger
than ln β 2 . The only possibility that has not already been ruled out previously is if
this trajectory hits (γ 1 , γ 2 , xt ) = (0, 0, xt ), for some xt ≤ ln β 2 . This is ruled out in
case 5.
(b) i = 2. Since u1 > 0, ẋ > 0; hence, here as well, we must eventually leave this region.
The cases not covered so far are if the trajectory hits (γ 1 , γ 2 , xt ) = (0, 0, x) for some
x < ln β 1 (ruled out in case 5), or if it hits (γ 1 , γ 2 , xt ) = (0, γ 2 , ln β 1 ) for some γ 2 ≤ 0.
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If γ 2 > γ 2 , then as in case 3, γ 2 must diverge to +∞, and so must x, violating the
transversality condition. If instead γ 2 < γ 2 , then u1 = 0 identically thereafter, in
which case γ 2,t → −∞, and player 2 never exerts effort. This outcome is identical
to the one in our reference trajectory. In fact, if player 2 exerts any effort, x must
increase at some point, from which point on γ 1 will diverge to +∞, and so will x,
violating the transversality condition.
5. Consider paths that start from (γ 1 , γ 2 , xt ) = (0, 0, x), for some x ≤ ln β 1 . There are two
subcases:
(a) x ∈ (β 2 , β 1 ). Then γ̇ 2 > 0; if also γ̇ 1 ≥ 0, we are back to the first case; if instead,
γ̇ 1 < 0, we are in the third case. Both cases have already been ruled out.
(b) x ≤ ln β 2 . Then there is a unique solution u∗2,t , given in Theorem 1, such that γ̇ i = 0.
Observe that, unlike in the symmetric case, u∗2 > 0 for all x ≤ ln β 2 . For uj > u∗j ,
γ̇ i > 0. There are four cases to consider. Either γ̇ i > 0, γ̇ j ≥ 0. Then the region
covered in case 1 is entered, and such a path cannot satisfy the necessary conditions.
Or γ̇ i ≤ 0, γ̇ j < 0, but then the region covered in case 2 is entered, and again this path
can be ruled out. Or γ̇ i > 0, but γ̇ j < 0, for some i = 1, 2, but this would lead to
one of the two regions covered in case 4, and given the dynamics there, such a region
cannot be entered for a positive interval of time starting from (0, 0, x). Or, finally,
ui = u∗i for both i = 1, 2, but since u∗2 > 0, ẋ > 0, and so, as in the case 3, γ 2 must
diverge to +∞, and so must x, violating the transversality condition.
(Sufficiency.) We have thus eliminated all but one outcome: the one in which the strongest
player experiments alone as long as he finds it profitable to do so. Sufficient conditions did not
rely on symmetry, hence this path is an equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Subtracting the equilibrium value of effort in the observable case from
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the value in the unobservable case gives
1−p
r
α(n − 1) p



(1 − p) α
p − α − αp ln
.
(1 − α) p

This term is positive, as can be seen as follows. Let f (p) be the term in brackets. This function
is convex, as f ′′ (p) = α/(p(1 − p)2 ), and its derivative at p = α is equal to (1 − α)−1 > 0. Hence,
f is increasing in p over the range [α, 1], and it is equal to 0 at p = α, so it is positive over this
range.

B



Proofs for Section 5
Throughout, let x := ln 1−p
, so that in particular x0 = ln 1−p
, and β = α−1 − 1.
p
p

Proof of Lemma 2: (Preliminaries.) Consider the objective function under a deadline T .
P
P
We again use the fact that ṗt = −pt (1 − pt ) i ui,t , and hence pt i ui,t = d log (1 − pt ) /dt. We
can then rewrite expression (3) as
r

Z

0

where u−i,t :=

P

j6=i

T




ṗt
ṗt
1 − p −rt
−
+α
+ u−i,t
e dt,
1 − pt
pt (1 − pt )
1 − pt

uj,t. Applying integration by parts to the objective, and ignoring irrelevant

terms, we obtain
Z

0

T



pt
r(α − 1) + αu−i,t
rα ln
+
1 − pt
1 − pt



−rt

e

−rT

dt − e

α



1−α 1
1 − pT
+ ln
α 1 − pT
pT



.

Making the further change of variable xt = ln ((1 − pt ) /pt ), and defining β := 1/α − 1, player i
maximizes:
Z

0

T

(−xt + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β))e−rt dt −

such that ẋt = ui,t + u−i,t ,
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e−rT
β 1 + e−xT + xT ,
r

over functions ui,t in [0, 1], given the function u−i,t .
The Hamiltonian for this problem is

H ui,t , xt , γ i,t := (−xt + e−xt (u−i,t /r − β))e−rt + γ̂ i,t (ui,t + u−i,t ) ,
and the salvage value is given by
φ (x, T ) := e−rT (β (1 + ex ) + x) /r.
We now drop the subscript i and, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we assume that p > α, which
is equivalent to x0 < ln β. We also maintain the assumption on the discount rate given in (4),
namely 1 + e−x0 (1/r − β) > 0.
(Necessary Conditions.) Define γ i,t := γ̂ i,t ert . By Pontryagin’s principle, there must exist a
continuous function γ i,t for each i, such that,
1. ui,t maximizes γ i,t (ui,t + u−i,t );
2. γ̇ i,t = rγ t + 1 + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β);
3. γ i,T = φx (xT , T ) = (βe−xT − 1) /r.
We again consider a phase diagram in Rn+1 , with dimensions γ 1 , ..., γ n , and x.
(Candidate Equilibrium.) Our candidate equilibrium strategy u∗i,t generates a trajectory that
starts at (γ 1 , ..., γ n , x0 ) = (0, ..., 0, x0 ), and has ui,t = u∗i,t := r(β − ext ) /(n − 1) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T̃ ,
and ui,t = u∗i,t := 1 for T̃ < t ≤ T . This implies γ i,t = 0 for t ≤ T̃ and γ i,t > 0 for t > T̃ . The
switching time T̃ is given by the solution to
T − T̃ − T (xT̃ ) = 0.
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(9)

The function T (x) in equation (9) is defined as
(n + r) (β − ex )
1
ln
.
T (x) :=
n+r
β+1
The equilibrium beliefs x∗t are given by the solution to ẋt = nu∗i,t . Therefore, for all t ≤ T̃ , we

have x∗t = ln β − ln(1 + (βe−x0 − 1)e−(n/(n−1) )rβt ), and for all t > T̃ we have x∗t = x∗T̃ + n(t − T̃ ). It
is immediate to verify that T (x) < Tn (x), which is the time it takes for beliefs to reach α when

n agents exert maximal effort: stopping occurs before beliefs have gone down to the Marshallian
threshold.
We first verify that our candidate strategy is an equilibrium. For all t ≤ T̃ , agents exert
effort at the interior level u∗t > 0. At time T̃ , agents switch to maximal effort. When u∗t = 1,
necessary condition 2 implies γ̇ T̃ > 0, and hence γ t > 0 for all t ∈ (T̃ , T ]. Finally, continuity
of the function γ ∗t requires that γ ∗T̃ = 0. We therefore need to verify that the solution to the
following differential equation,
∗

γ̇ t = rγ t + 1 + e−xt ((n − 1) /r − β),
∗

with boundary condition γ T = (βe−xT −1)/r, is equal to zero at t = T̃ . Notice that γ T is positive
because xT ≤ ln β. Using the fact that x∗t = x∗T̃ +n(t− T̃ ), the solution to the differential equation
is given by
∗

γ ∗t


(n − 1 − rβ) enT̃ −xT̃ −(n+r)T +rt
=
e
− e−nt −
r (n + r)



1 β −r(T −t)−n(T −T̃ )−x∗
T̃
− e
r
r



.

(10)

The continuity of γ ∗t is verified by evaluating (10) at t = T̃ , and setting the right-hand side equal
to zero. We then obtain exactly equation (9), which defines T̃ .
If T (x0 ) ≥ T , then γ t > 0 for all t, and agents exert u∗t ≡ 1. This implies γ ∗t is given by
(10), where we replace x∗T̃ with x0 . It then suffices to verify that γ ∗0 > 0. Indeed, this is the case,
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because the right-hand side of (10) is increasing in t, decreasing in T , and it would be equal to
zero at t = 0 with a deadline of T (x0 ) > T .
(Uniqueness.) We now rule out all other symmetric paths. Suppose that, in equilibrium,
agents choose effort ut = 1 at some time t1 < T̃ . This would imply γ t1 ≥ 0. However, if
ut1 = 1, then necessary condition 2 and assumption (4) on the discount rate imply γ̇ t1 > 0.
Therefore, we might as well consider the case of γ t1 > 0. In this case, agents exert maximal
effort, and γ t increases from time t on. However, let xt = xt1 + n (t − t1 ), and consider the
solution to the differential equation γ̇ t = rγ t + 1 + e−xt ((n − 1) /r − β) with boundary condition
γ T = (βe−xT − 1) /r. Again, the solution γ t will be strictly increasing. Furthermore, we will
have γ T̃ = 0 and therefore γ t1 < 0, since t1 < T̃ , contradicting the assumption that γ t1 ≥ 0.

Now suppose agents continue to exert effort at the interior levels of ut = r(β − ext ) /(n − 1)

for t > T̃ . Denote the switching time to maximal effort by t2 > T̃ , with γ t2 = 0. The implied
path of γ ∗t , given the transversality condition, would then imply γ t2 > 0, which contradicts the
assumption of interior effort levels for t ≤ t2 .
Finally, suppose that agents choose effort ut = 0 at any time t3 . This requires γ t3 ≤ 0.
However, γ t3 ≤ 0 and ut3 = 0 also imply γ̇ t3 < 0. Therefore, we consider the case of γ t < 0. In
this case, agents exert no effort, and γ t decreases for all t ≥ t3 . In particular, this implies γ T < 0,
which violates the transversality condition. Indeed, since xt < ln β (because ut = 0 from time t3
on), the transversality condition requires γ T > 0.
(Sufficiency.) The sufficient conditions in the proof of Theorem 1 did not rely on the infinite
horizon, so this path is an equilibrium.



Proof of Theorem 3: Let Vi (p) := Vi (p, T (p)). If the deadline is such that effort switches to 1
at time T̃ , the payoff of agent i is then

Vi (T̃ ) := (1 − p)

Z

0

T̃

V (pT̃ )
(npt − α) ∗ −rt
ui,t e dt + e−rT̃
1 − pt
1 − pT̃
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!

,

where pt solves ṗt = −pt (1−pt )nu∗i,t , p0 = p. Taking derivatives with respect to T̃ , and considering
the derivative at T̃ = 0 gives
dVi (T̃ )
dT̃

T̃ =0

α((n − 1)p + r) − pr
=
(n − α)(n − 1)p2

(n − α)p − α(n − p)



(n − α)p
α(n − p) − r(p − α)

!
n
 n+r

.

The derivative with respect to r of the term in parenthesis has a derivative equal to (up to a
positive multiplicative constant)
ln

so

dVi (T̃ )
dT̃
T̃ =0



(n − α)p
α(n − p) − r(p − α)

is decreasing in r. Since



−



(n − α)p
−1
α(n − p) − r(p − α)

dVi (T̃ )
dT̃
T̃ =0,r=0

= 0, it follows that



≤ 0,

dVi (T̃ )
dT̃
T̃ =0

(11)

≤ 0. Because

it is optimal to have agents choose level of effort u = 1 as long as possible, the optimal value
is T̃ = 0: agents should be given a deadline for which it is optimal to exert at a maximal rate
immediately.
Finally, differentiating T (p̄) with respect to r, one can show that −∂T /∂r is exactly equal to
expression (11), and so the optimal deadline is increasing in the discount rate.
The Agent’s Problem: Given a wage function wt , each agent maximizes
Z

0

∞

P

j

uj pt wt − αui −rt
e dt.
1 − pt

Integrating by parts and ignoring constant terms (assuming, as will be verified, that w is differentiable) gives
w0
+
1−p

Z

0

∞



p
r (α − w) + αu−i + ẇ
+ rα ln
1−p
1−p
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e−rt dt.

In terms of the function x, agent i maximizes
−x0

w0 1 + e



Z

+

∞

0

over functions ui such that ẋ =

P

j


−rαx + (r (α − w) + αu−i + ẇ)e−x e−rt dt,
uj . Applying Pontryagin’s principle gives

ẇ − rw = −α (rex + r + u−i) ,
which generalizes the earlier formula for w = 1. Note that this formula will hold even if u = 1 over
some interval, as the principal cannot gain from giving agents strict rather than weak incentives
to exert maximal effort.
Proof of Theorem 4 (Agents’ Optimal Wage): Agents induce symmetric levels of effort
ui,t = ut in order to maximize
Z

∞

nut e−x v − α 1 + e−x

0



e−rt dt,

subject to
Z

0

∞

nut (v − nwt ) e−x e−rt dt = 0,

rw − α (rex + r + (n − 1) ut ) = ẇ,
nut = ẋ.
Integrating by parts both the objective and the first constraint gives the following program
max
ut

Z

0

∞


− e−x (v − α) + αx e−rt dt,

s.t. ẋ = nut , ẇ = rw − α (rex + r + (n − 1) ut ) ,
Z ∞
−x0
(v − nw0 + α (n − 1)) + nα − r (v − α)
e
e−x e−rt dt = 0.
0
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Associate the co-state µ to the constraint ẇ = rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1) u), σ to the isoperimetric
R∞
constraint k0 = 0 e−x e−rt dt and γ to ẋ = nu. Given the constraint u ≤ 1, with associated

Lagrangian coefficient λ, the Hamiltonian is


H = − e−x (v − α) + αx e−rt + σe−x e−rt + γnu + µ (rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1) u)) + λ (1 − u) ,
with λ ≥ 0 and λ (1 − u) = 0. So µ = µ0 e−rt , and
γn − αµ (n − 1) − λ = 0.
Observe that, if λ = 0 over some interval, then γ = α n−1
µ0 e−rt and therefore γ̇ = −rα n−1
µ0 e−rt .
n
n
But we would then have

−γ̇ = − −e−x (v − α) + α e−rt − σe−x e−rt − αµrex ,
n−1
rα
µ0 = e−x (v − α − σ) − α − αµ0 rex ,
n
from which it follows that x is constant over that interval, a contradiction. So λ > 0 and u = 1.
Hence, x = x0 + nt (or more precisely, on any subinterval on which u = 1), and we obtain the
following ordinary differential equation (hereafter, ODE) for the wage:

ẇ = rw − α rex0 +nt + r + (n − 1) .
It remains to determine the initial value of w, or equivalently, the time at which all effort stops.
Once this time T is set, we know that the wage must satisfy the terminal condition wT = α/pT .
Therefore, the planner’s problem reduces to finding the positive root T of the “budget” function
RT
n (v − nwt ) e−x e−rt dt, where wt is given by the previous ODE. This gives, upon simplification,
0
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that T is the root of
v
nr x0 +nT nT
r
( − 1)(e(n+r)T − 1) − (n − 1)enT (erT − 1) −
e
(e − erT ) = 0.
n+r α
n−r
Setting δ := enT , the left-hand side admits a single positive critical point, which gives precisely
the solution to the monopolist’s problem (to be described below). This means that either the
left-hand side is positive when T → ∞, in which case it admits no strictly positive root, or it
is strictly negative, in which it admits exactly one root, and that root exceeds the optimal T
for the monopolist. Clearly, if n > r, the left-hand side is negative for large enough r, and we
assume so thereafter. To compare the belief at the time of stopping with the asymptotic belief in
the baseline model, αn/v (the solution to pv/n = α), we plug in the value of v/α corresponding
to this asymptotic threshold (i.e., v/α = nex0 +nT ), and argue that the left-hand side is negative
for r small enough (recall that the result was only claimed for r low enough). Indeed, define
X = nT , and consider a series expansion around r = 0; the left-hand side equals, to the second
order,

−(n − 1) 1 + (X − 1)eX r + o(r),

which is always negative, since 1 + (X − 1)eX ≥ 0. Thus, the root is such that the belief has
not yet reached the asymptotic belief of the baseline model. In fact, the limit of the left-hand
side as r → 0 does not vanish for v/α = nex0 +nT , implying that the difference in those beliefs is
strict, even in the limit.
Proof of Theorem 5 (Principal’s Optimal Wage): Let us now turn to the problem of
the profit-maximizing principal. The project is worth v to him. So the value of the project is
(proportional to)
Z

0

∞

upt (v − nwt ) −rt
e dt,
1 − pt

subject to ẋ = nu and ẇ = rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1) u) (u := ui). Integrating by parts and
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ignoring irrelevant terms gives
−x0

(v − nw0 ) e
or
−x0

(v − nw0 ) e

−

Z

0

−

Z

0

∞

e−x (rv − n (rw − ẇ)) e−rt dt,

∞

e−x (rv − nα (rex + r + (n − 1) u)) e−rt dt.

(Observe that there is a term in the integrand that is independent of x, u, w and can be ignored.)
Associate the co-state µ to the constraint ẇ = rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1) u), and γ to ẋ = nu.
Given the constraint u ≤ 1, with associated Lagrangian coefficient λ, the Hamiltonian is

− e−x (rv − nα (r + (n − 1) u)) e−rt + γnu + µ (rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1) u)) + λ (1 − u) ,
with λ ≥ 0 and λ (1 − u) = 0. So µ = µ0 e−rt , and
(nγ − λ) ert = (n − 1) αµ0 − n (n − 1) αe−x .
Therefore

We also have


nγ̇ert − λ̇ert + r (n − 1) αµ0 − n (n − 1) αe−x = n2 (n − 1) uαe−x .
−e−x (rv − nα (r + (n − 1) u)) e−rt + µ0 ert αrex = γ̇,

which implies that
ne−x (α − v) + αµ0 (n − 1 + nex ) =
Observe that, if λ̇ = 0 over some interval, then
µ0 ex (n − 1 + nex ) = n
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v−α
,
α

λ̇ rt
e .
r

from which it follows that x is constant over that interval, a contradiction. So λ is not constant,
and therefore, u = 1. Hence, x = x0 + nt (or more precisely, on any subinterval on which u = 1),
which gives
 λ̇
ne−(x0 +nt) (α − v) + αµ0 n − 1 + nex0 +nt = ert ,
r

which can be integrated for λ and γ then follows. It remains to determine the initial value of w,
or equivalently, the time at which all effort stops. Integrating the differential equation


1 − p nt
e +r+n−1
ẇ − rw = −α r
p
gives wt , as a function of the as yet undetermined initial value w(δ), as given in Theorem 4. Let
T denote the time at which all effort stops. Given that pT wT = α, and since pT =

p
p+(1−p)enT

we

can solve for w0 = w(δ) as a function of δ = enT . We may now explicitly solve for the principal’s
payoff, as a function of δ, and directly verify that it is concave in δ, with a maximum achieved
at the value of δ given in Section 4.2. The details are omitted.
To show that the profit-maximizing time horizon T ∗ is shorter than the welfare-maximizing
deadline T , let v = n and r = 0. The difference between the two horizons may be written as
nT ∗

e

nT

−e

p
=
2n(1 − p)

r


(n − α)p
1−p
(n − 1) + 4n
(n/α − 1) − (n − 1) −
.
p
α(n − p)
2

Simplifying yields
e2nT − e2nT ∝ − (n − p̄)−2 p̄−1 α−2 (p̄ − α) (1 − p̄) n2 < 0,
∗

since α < p̄. 
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C

Proofs for Section 6

Proof of Theorem 6: We now consider the case with complementarities
ṗt = −pt (1 − pt ) f (u1,t , ..., un,t) .
Writing in terms of the log-likelihood ratio, we obtain xt = ln(1−pt )/pt , and ẋt = f (u1,t , ..., un,t).
The objective is

r

Z∞

(pt f (u1,t , ..., un,t ) − αui,t ) e−rt−

Rt
0

ps f (u1,s ,...,un,s )ds

0



dt = r 1 − (1 − p̄)

Z∞
0



r + αui,t −rt 
e dt ,
1 − pt

where the equality follows from integration by parts. So we are minimizing
Z∞
0


(r + αui,t ) 1 + e−xt e−rt dt such that ẋt = f (u1,t , ..., un,t ) .

Pontryagin’s principle gives (assuming an interior solution)

α 1 + e−x e−rt + λfi (u1 , ..., un ) = 0, and λ̇ = (r + αui) e−x−rt ,
where fi is the derivative of f with respect to ui . Assuming a symmetric solution (u1,t , ..., un,t ) =
ut ∈ Rn , and dropping time subscripts, we have

α 1 + e−x e−rt = −λfi (u), λ̇ = − (r + αu) e−x−rt , ẋ = f (u).
So, differentiating the first equation, and defining v (x) = u (t), so that v ′ (x) ẋ = u̇,
r

 f (v)

1
+v
=
1−
α
f (v)
p
i
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Σj fij (v) ′
r
.
v −
fi (v)
f (v)

(12)

1

This ODE characterizes the interior solution (if any) of the problem. For f (u1 , ..., un ) = (Σi uρi ) ρ ,
and u1 = · · · = un , Σj fij = 0, and so the equation can be solved for u = v, i.e., defining
kn := n1−1/ρ ,

r
u(p) =
n−1



1 kn
−
α
p



.

Again, it is simple to verify that, if α−1 ≥ kn /p, agents do not exert effort at a maximal rate on
any interval of time in equilibrium. Sufficiency follows as in the baseline model. While it is not
possible to solve for the function pt , its inverse t(p) can be computed, and it can be verified that
limp→αkn t(p) = ∞, while t(p) < ∞ for p > αkn . 
Proof of Theorem 7:
The case ρ ≥ 1/2: Writing equation (12) for each player separately, we obtain

 1
f (u1 , u2 )  r
r
fii (u1 , u2)u̇i + fij (u1 , u2)u˙j
−
−
+ ui =
−
.
fi (u1 , u2)
α
p
fi (u1 , u2 )
fi (u1 , u2 )2
Inserting the C.E.S. function, and defining the ratio σ i (p) = ui (p) /uj (p), We obtain
(1 −

1
r ρ ρ
u̇i u̇j
σ i )(u1 + uρ2 )1/ρ = ((1 − ρ)( − ) − r(1 + σ ρi )).
αui
p
ui uj

(13)

By adding equations (13) for each player, we obtain the relationship that needs to hold between
u1 and u2 . Formally,
r
u2 =
2ασ ρ1



σ 2ρ−1
1

1
α
+ 1 − (σ ρ1 + 1)2− ρ
p



.

(14)

Similarly, subtract equations (13), substitute the expression for u2 in (14), and use u1 =
σ 1 u2 (σ 1 ) . We then obtain the following ordinary differential equation for σ 1 :
ρ) σ ′1

(1 −
σ1


 
ρ
α
1−1/ρ
2
1
−
+
1)
(σ
1
p
1 
,
=
1 − 2ρ−1
α
1−p
σ1
+ 1 − p (σ ρ1 + 1)2−1/ρ


(6)

where σ 1 (p) := u1,0 /u2,0. Notice that σ 1 will not be a function of r (hence patience will only
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influence levels of effort, not the allocation).
(σ bounded.) We now drop the subscript 1 and refer to σ 1 as σ. We first show that σ stays

bounded for all p. Notice that when u2 = 0, that is when α/p = (σ 2ρ−1 + 1) (σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ , σ ′

goes to +∞ whenever σ > 1. However, observe that for ρ ≥ 1/2,

σ ρ (1 − σ ρ−1 )
σρ
≥
.
(1 − αp )ρ
σ 2ρ−1 + 1 − αp (σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ
To see this, consider the function x 7→ σ ρ (σ 2ρ−1 + 1 − x(σρ + 1)2−1/ρ ) − σ ρ (1 − σ ρ−1 )(1 − x)ρ , which
has a minimum on [0, 1] that is positive whenever ρ ≥ 1/2. Given this, and since the right-hand

side of (6) is bounded by −2/ ((1 − p) (1 − α/p)ρ ), the solution to (6) must lie below the solution
of the differential equation
(1 − ρ) σ ′
1
1
= −2
,
σ
1 − p (1 − αp )ρ

with the same initial condition at p. This differential equation is easy to integrate, and since
ρ < 1, its solution is finite at p = α. Furthermore, either σ is finite, or if it diverges, then α/p = 1
when σ → ∞, but then the previous argument applies. Note however that α/p → 1 requires
σ 2ρ−1 + 1
→1
(σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ
and so ρ > 1/2.
(Experimentation in infinite time.) We know that σ ′ → ∞ as u2 → 0. Now differentiate the
identity p (t (p)) = p, and obtain the following ODE for the function t (p):
t′ (p) = −

1
.
p (1 − p) u2 (σ ρ1 + 1)1/ρ

Then compare t (q) with − ln (p − p̄). For p close to p̄ := α(σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ /(σ 2ρ−1 + 1) , we would
like to have t′ (p) < −1/ (p − p̄), so that t (p) (which is decreasing) is steeper than − ln (p − p̄).
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We then require
p (1 − p) u2 (σρ1 + 1)1/ρ < (p − p̄) .
But this is the case, since σ stays bounded when ρ > 1/2, and r is small enough. We have:
p (1 − p) u2 (σ ρ1 + 1)1/ρ − (p − p̄)




α(σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ
r
α ρ
ρ
2ρ−1
2− ρ1
1/ρ
(σ 1 + 1) − p −
= p (1 − p)
σ1
+ 1 − (σ 1 + 1)
2ασ ρ1
p
(σ 2ρ−1 + 1)


 (1 − p) (σ ρ + 1)1/ρ (σ 2ρ−1 + 1)


ρ
2ρ−1
2− ρ1
1
− 1 < 0.
r
+ 1 − α(σ 1 + 1)
= p σ1
2ασ ρ1
The case ρ = 1/2: Consider equation (6) again: let y := σ 1−ρ , so that, when ρ = 1/2, we have:
y′
(1 − y) α
= .
(y + 1) (2p − α) (1 − p)
y
Let y0 > 1 and define the function:
(y0 − 1)2
g (p) :=
2y0



p − 12 α 1 − p
1 − p p − 21 α

α
 2−α

.

(Equilibrium.) The exact solution is then given by
q
y (p) = 1 + g (p) + g (p)2 + 2g (p)

2
q
2
⇒ σ (p) =
1 + g (p) + g (p) + 2g (p) ,
and hence g (p) → ∞ and σ → ∞ as p → α. We can derive the equilibrium levels of effort from
equation (14), and obtain that:
f (u1 (p) , u2 (p)) = 2r



84

p − α/2
pα



(g (p) + 2) .

(Experimentation in finite time.) Finally, by setting K :=

(y0 −1)2
y0



p− 12 α
1−p

α
 2−α

, we can show that

the solution to p′ = −p (1 − p) f (u1 (p) , u2 (p)) lies below the solution to
p′ = − (1 − p) (p − α/2)



1−p
p − 12 α

α
 2−α

2
+
K

!

2rK
,
α

which converges to α/2 in finite time. So experimentation stops in finite time when ρ = 1/2.
The case ρ < 1/2: Recall that

 
′
2 1 − αp (σ ρ + 1)1−1/ρ
 1 = (1 − ρ) σ ,
1 −
σ 2ρ−1 + 1 − αp (σ ρ + 1)2−1/ρ 1 − p
σ


which is equivalent to, considering the inverse function p(σ),
(1 − ρ)(1 − p(σ))
p (σ) =
σ
′



2(1 + σ ρ )
1− p
(1 + σ ρ )1/ρ (σ 2ρ−1 + 1) − (σ 2ρ − 1)
α



.

It is immediate to verify that p′ (σ)|p/α=g(σ) = 0, while g ′ (σ) < 0 for ρ < 1/2. This implies that
σ(p) cannot converge to a finite value, but that it must diverge to infinity. Also, the second term
in brackets converges to zero unless p → 0, since
1 + σρ
(1 + σ ρ )1/ρ (σ 2ρ−1 + 1)
=
0,
and
lim
= +∞.
σ→∞ σ 2ρ − 1
σ→∞
σ 2ρ − 1
lim

So if p does not converge to 0, p′ (σ) is eventually positive, which is impossible. So p must
converge to zero. But exerting effort for beliefs arbitrarily close to zero yields strictly negative
profits, as even the team would not exert effort for sufficiently low beliefs. So such an equilibrium
cannot exist. 
Remarks on the case α1 6= α2 : Back to the case, ρ > 1/2, we know analyze the equilibria
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with asymmetric players. Equations (14) and (6) may now be written as

2 1−



α2
(σ ρ1
p

1−1/ρ

+ 1)





′
1 
 = (1 − ρ) σ 1 ,
1 − α2 2ρ−1
1−p
σ1
+ 1 − αp2 (σ ρ1 + 1)2−1/ρ
σ
α1 1


1
r
α2 2ρ−1
α2
= u2 .
+ 1 − (σ ρ1 + 1)2− ρ
σ1
ρ
2α2 σ 1 α1
p

It is easy to show that when u2 > 0 and σ 1 = 1, then σ ′1 (p) and (α2 − α1 ) have the same sign.
Let α2 > α1 so player 1 is the more efficient agent. Since ṗt < 0, the equilibrium can never move
from a scenario with σ 1 < 1 to one with σ 1 > 1. Therefore, if agents take turns, the more efficient
agent must exert higher effort first (and for σ 0 close enough to one, this happens indeed). Both
agents stop working when

1

α2 (σρ + 1)2− ρ
p = α2 12ρ−1
.
σ
+
1
1
α1
1

This expression is minimized at σ ∗ = (α2 /α1 ) 1−ρ > 1, so the equilibrium with the highest
experimentation level is one in which players never take turns. The corresponding threshold for
beliefs is

1−1/ρ
p∗ = α2 (α2 /α1 )ρ/(1−ρ) + 1
.
This threshold will be reached in infinite time, since the corresponding terminal value for σ 1 is
finite (see the proof of Theorem 6). Finally, notice that the value of p∗ is increasing in α2 and
1

equal to α21− ρ if α1 = α2 = α.
Proof of Theorem 8: Applying integration by parts and ignoring constant terms, the payoff
that agent i maximizes is equal to

−

Z

0

3

∞

(r + αi uit )

X
e−rt
k
k
dt
such
that
ṗ
/p
=
pj uj − uk , k = 0, . . . , 3.
p3t
j=0

Defining xi such that pi = p3 e−xi , for i = 1, 2, note that ẋi = ui. Defining also q := p−1
3 , the
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problem reduces to maximizing
−

Z

0

∞

(r + αui ) qe−rt dt such that q̇ = (1 − q)(u1 + u2 ) + u1 e−x2 + u2 e−x1 , ẋi = ui, i = 1, 2.

Let µi denote the co-state variable associated with xi . Pontryagin’s principle gives

αqe−rt = γ 1 − q + e−xj + µi , γ̇ = (r + αui) e−rt + γ (u1 + u2 ) , µ̇i = γuj e−xi ,
or, equivalently, if we let σ = γe−x1 −x2 ,

αqe−rt = σex1 +x2 1 − q + e−xj + µi , σ̇ = (r + αui ) e−rt−x1 −x2 , µ̇i = σuj exj .
Since we are focusing on a symmetric solution, this means


αqe−rt = σe2x 1 − q + e−x + µ, σ̇ = (r + αu) e−rt−2x , µ̇ = σuex , q̇ = 2u 1 − q + e−x , ẋ = u.
Differentiate αqe−rt = σe2x (1 − q + e−x ) + µ and substitute for σ̇ and µ̇ to get



α (q̇ − rq) e−rt − (r + αu) e−rt 1 − q + e−x = 2uσe2x 1 − q + e−x − 2u 1 − q + e−x σe2x = 0,
so that
q=
So we are left with the system
q=


αu − r
1 + e−x .
αu − (1 − α) r



αu − r
1 + e−x , q̇ = 2u 1 − q + e−x , ẋ = u.
αu − (1 − α) r


We make the following change of variable. Let v (q) = x (t), so v ′ (q) q̇ = ẋ, or 2v ′ (q) 1 − q + e−v(q) =
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1, whose positive solution is

v(q) = ln

1+

!
p
1 + C(q − 1)
.
q−1
p0 p3
.
p1 p2

Since we have v(q(0)) = x(0) = ln(p3 (0)/p1(0)), we can solve for C to get C =
that
r
u(q) =
α

It follows



αq
−1/2
1−
(1 + (1 + C(q − 1))
) ,
q−1

and, since t′ (q) = v ′ (q)/u, we also get that t(q), the time at which the (inverse) belief is q, is
given by t(q) = F (q) − F (q0 ), where q0 = 1/p3 , and


p

α
ln(C(1 − q(1 − α)) − 1 + 1 + C(q − 1)) −
F (q) =
2r(α − 1) 



√

2(α−1)

1+C(q−1)−1

2 arctan √
4α(1−α)(1−C)−1
p
4α(1 − α)(1 − C) + 1




.


Observe that, as q → ∞, u = r (1 − α) /α > 0, while it is clearly negative for q ↓ 1. So
experimentation stops at some belief, although we may only reach this belief asymptotically. Let
p
s := 1 + C(q − 1). Solving for the (larger) root of u (q) = 0 gives
q ∗ :=

2 (1 − C)
p
,
1 − 2C − 2α (1 − C) + 1 − 4α (1 − α) (1 − C)

and p̃3 , as defined in the text, is the reciprocal of q ∗ . It follows from the explicit solution for F
that limq→q∗ t(q) = ∞, i.e. experimentation never stops. This characterizes the unique candidate
for an interior, symmetric solution, and it is easy to verify that, for low enough discounting (more
precisely, whenever u(q0 ), as given above, is less than 1), agents cannot exert effort at a maximal
rate over some interval of time in equilibrium. Sufficiency follows from the linearity and concavity
properties of the objective, as in the baseline model. 
The case in which p1 6= p2 : (Equilibrium with asymmetric players.) Suppose that p̄1 > p̄2 .
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This means x1 (0) < x2 (0). In the unique equilibrium, player 1 exerts effort at the maximal rate
until x1 (t) = x2 (t). From that point on, both agents work symmetrically. Clearly, the second
phase does not take place if p3 reaches p̃3 before x1 = x2 . It is immediate to see that this is
an equilibrium. While player 1 works, player 2 prefers to wait. When exerting effort at a level
that is interior, the two players play the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Theorem 5.
Finally, player 1 has incentives to work alone until the time at which x1 = x2 , since player 2 is
not exerting effort, and player 1 expects to work even after that time.
(Uniqueness.) For the uniqueness part, we repeatedly use the following claim: there cannot be a
last person working alone. While a detailed analysis is omitted, this result is intuitive: if there
exists a last agent i working alone, then in the last instants t in which player j is required to
work, he has an incentive to deviate and shirk. Since player i will start working at t + dt anyway,
the gains in saved effort exceed the (vanishing) loss due to delayed arrival of a success. This
result rules out cases in which players work sequentially. Suppose that player 1 worked until his
individual threshold p∗1 . If the asymmetry in p̄i is sufficiently small, player 2 would then start
working from there, because we would have p2 > p∗1 . But then, anticipating that player 2 will
start working at the maximal rate, player 1 wants to deviate and shirk in the last instants before
his beliefs reach the threshold. A qualitatively identical scenario arises if player 2 works alone
until the individual threshold p∗2 . We now analyze the candidate interior equilibrium, and rule it
out based on the same claim. Consider again the system of equations:

αqe−rt = σex1 +x2 1 − q + e−xj + µi , σ̇ = (r + αui ) e−rt−x1 −x2 , µ̇i = σuj exj ,
q̇ = (1 − q) (u1 + u2 ) + u1 e−x2 + u2 e−x1 , ẋi = ui .

As before, differentiate the first equation, and plug in the formulas for σ̇, µ̇i , q̇. Upon simplification, we obtain the following relation between uj and xi , xj , q :
ui =

r 1 − q + e−xi + αq
.
α 1 − q + e−xj
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(15)

Given that ẋi = ui, we can also solve the equation
q̇ = (1 − q) (u1 + u2 ) + u1 e−x2 + u2e−x1 ,

(16)

and obtain as a general solution
q = 1 − ke−x1 −x2 + e−x1 + e−x2 ,

(17)

for some constant k. As before, we define vi (q) := xi (t), so that
vi′ (q) q̇ = ẋi = ui.
Substituting (15) in (16), we obtain the following first-order differential equation, separately for
each agent’s effort:

1 − q + e−vi + αq
.
2 (1 − q) + e−v1 + e−v2 + 2αq vi′ =
1 − q + e−vj
Finally, using (17), we obtain


1 − q + e−vi + αq
−vi
−vi (1 − q) k + 1
′
,
1−q+e +e
+
2αq
v
=
i
ke−vi − 1
e−vi (1−q)k+1
−v
ke i −1
which is the desired ODE characterizing vi (q). Observe that the ODEs for v1 (q) and v2 (q)
differ only because of the initial condition. In particular, vi (q (0)) = xi (0), implying that
v1 (q (0)) < v2 (q (0)). Since the paths of the solutions to the two ODEs cannot cross, v1 (q) will
reach zero for a level q̃ for which v2 (q̃) > 0. The fact that the weaker player works harder is
clearly necessary in order to have an interior (i.e. mixed strategy) equilibrium. When player
1 stops working, however, player 2 should continue exerting effort at the maximal rate, and he
will be the last player working, which we ruled out. This rules out all but the equilibrium we
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described earlier.
Interpretation of p̃3 in terms of the team problem: We prove here that the threshold p̃3
is also the threshold at which the team would stop, if the value was 1/2 per agent. In the team
problem, agents would choose to allocate efforts equally (if p1 = p2 ), and they would exert effort
at the maximal rate. That is, they would choose a time T to maximize
−

Z

T
−rt

(r + 2α)qt e

0

dt −

Z

∞
−rt

rqT e

T

dt = −

Z

T
0

(r + 2α)qt e−rt dt − qT e−rT .

The optimal time then satisfies (taking first-order conditions with respect to T )
−(r + 2α)qT e−rT + rqT e−rT − q̇T e−rT = 0, or

q̇T
= −2α.
qT

Given that q, as defined in the proof of Theorem 5, satisfies q̇ = (1 − q) (u1 + u2 ), this means
that
qT =

The solution to q̇ = 2 1 − q +

p1 −t
e
p3



for z :=

p1 −T
e .
p3

That is, z =

p1 −T
e
p3

1−α

.
1

0

is 1 − qt = ke−2t − 2 pp3 e−t , with k := − pp3 . This gives

−α + (1 − α)
−(1−2α)+

1+

r

p0 p3 2
z + (1 − 2α) z = 0,
(p1 )2
0 3

(1−2α)2 +4α(1−α) p 1p 2
(p )

0 3

2(1−α) p 1p 2

, and therefore

(p )

qT =

2 (1 − C)
p
= 1/p̃3 .
1 − 2C − 2α (1 − C) + 1 − 4α (1 − α) (1 − C)

Therefore, effort stops when the belief reaches the same threshold in both problems. 
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D

Additional Proofs

D.1

Observable Efforts with Deadlines

We identify an equilibrium in three phases. For a given prior belief p̄, agents initially exert
interior effort levels (phase 1); they then stop working for an interval of time (phase 2); and
finally, they exert maximal effort until the deadline (phase 3). Either phase 1 or both phases 1
and 2 could be empty. We solve for the optimal strategies proceeding backwards in time, and so
we start from the deadline T .
(Phase 3.) Suppose the posterior belief pt and the remaining time T − t are such that all agents
are exerting maximal effort ui = 1. Under the Markov assumption, all agents will continue
choosing ui = 1 even after a deviation. Therefore, the individual incentives to deviate from
maximal effort are unchanged from the unobservable case, and the proof of Lemma 2 extends
to the observable case. In particular, we obtain a critical time t̃ after which agents can sustain
maximal effort until the end of the game, given the deadline T and the current posterior p. This
time is analogous to T̃ in equation (9), and it is given by
t̃ (p) = T −

(n − α)p
1
ln
.
n + r α(n − p) − r(p − α)



We now verify the optimality of maximal effort over the time interval t̃ (p) , T . Consider the
optimality equation

0 = max {(ui + u−i ) p − ui α − (r + (ui + u−i)p) V − (ui + u−i) p (1 − p) Vp + Vt } ,
ui

(18)

and let W (p, t) indicate the continuation value, given by the returns to n players exerting effort
ui,t = 1 from time t until the deadline T .
W (p, t) = (1 − p)

Z

T −t
0
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nps − α −rs
e ds,
1 − ps

with
ps =

p
.
p + (1 − p)ens

We then have
W (p, t) =

 α

p (n − α)
1 − e−(n+r)(T −t) − (1 − p) 1 − e−r(T −t) .
n+r
r

Substitute W (p, t) into the optimality equation (18), and consider the incentives to exert effort:
∂W
= p − α − pW − p (1 − p) Wp .
∂ui

(19)

It is immediate to verify that the right-hand side of (19) is equal to zero when t = t̃ (p). Therefore,

agents are indifferent between effort levels along the frontier p, t̃ (p) . Furthermore, differentiating the right-hand side of (19) with respect to time, we obtain
d
dt



∂W
∂ui



= p exp (− (T − t) (n + r)) (n − α) > 0,

so agents have strict incentives to work throughout the third phase.
(Phase 2.) If the deadline is long enough, so that t̃ (p̄) > 0, there exists a phase in which players
do not exert any effort. In this “shirking” region, the equilibrium value is given by

Ω (p, t) := e−r(t̃(p)−t) W p, t̃ (p) .
We now use Ω (p, t) to construct the frontier t̂ (p) that separates the region in the (p, t) space
with interior effort from the shirking region. If effort is interior, by the optimality equation, the
value function must satisfy the ordinary differential equation
pα − V (p, t) − p (1 − p) Vp (p, t) = 0,
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(20)

which is obtained by setting by the right-hand side of (19) equal to zero. The general solution
of equation (20) is given by

V (p, t) = 1 − α + k (t) − α ln

p
1−p



(1 − p) .

(21)

We impose the smooth pasting and value matching conditions of the functions V (p, t) and Ω (p, t):
V p, t̂ (p)
Vp p, t̂ (p)





= Ω p, t̂ (p)




= Ωp p, t̂ (p) .

We can then solve for the second switching frontier t̂ (p), and obtain


1
(n − α)p
1
α2 (1 − p) (n − 1)
t̂ (p) = T −
ln
− ln 1 +
n + r α (n + r) − p(α + r) r
(α (n + r) − p(α + r)) (p − α)


2
α (1 − p) (n − 1)
1
,
= t̃ (p) − ln 1 +
r
(α (n + r) − p(α + r)) (p − α)
where the log term is always positive. We also obtain the equilibrium value of the constant of
integration k (t) in equation (21):
k (t) =

Ω (p̂ (t) , t) − (1 − α)
p̂ (t)
+ α ln
,
1 − p̂ (t)
1 − p̂ (t)

where p̂ (t) is the inverse function of t̂ (p). Finally, we verify the optimality of zero effort in this
phase. By construction (value matching), agents are indifferent between levels of effort on the

frontier p, t̂ (p) . Now fix a p and evaluate how the expression is changing with t. We have
d[LHS(20)]
= −r (p − α) < 0,
dt

so agents have no incentives to exert effort at any time past the frontier t̂ (p).
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(Phase 1.) In the first phase, interior effort implies u (p, t) must satisfy the optimality equation
V (p, t) = 1 − α + (1 − p)



p̂ (t) 1 − p
Ω (p̂ (t) , t) − (1 − α)
+ α ln
1 − p̂ (t)
1 − p̂ (t) p



,

so it must be that
u (p, t) =

rV (p, t) − Vt (p, t)
.
α (n − 1)

Optimality of interior effort then follows by construction. Furthermore, the equilibrium evolution
of beliefs is given by the solution to
ṗ = −p (1 − p) nu (p, t) .
The next figure illustrates the evolution of beliefs and the loci (p, t) separating the three phases.

D.2

Learning-by-Doing

Following Doraszelski (2003), we model the accumulated knowledge of player i as
żi = ui − δzi ,
with z0 = 0 (though this boundary condition is not necessary, as we will see). The arrival rate
of a breakthrough, or human capital, for player i is given by
hi = λui + ρziφ .
It follows that beliefs evolve according to
ṗt = −pt (1 − pt )
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Parameters: r=0.1, n=2, p =.75, α=.25, T=5
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Figure 13: The three phases of the equilibrium
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5

and therefore player i seeks to maximize:
V

=

Z

∞

Z

∞

(pt

0

=

X
i

pt

0

hi,t − αui,t )e−

X
j

hj,t − αui,t

!

Rt

0 (ps

P

j

hj,s +r)ds

dt

1 − p̄ −rt
e dt,
1 − pt

by the usual integration by parts. Defining, as usual x = ln((1 − p)/p), so that ẋ =
ignoring the constant (1 − p̄), we have
V =

Z

P

i

hi,t , and

∞
0

(ẋe−x − (1 + e−x )αui )e−rt dt.

Again, we integrate the first term by parts, and ignore the values at the endpoint (fixed, or zero),
so that maximizing V is equivalent to maximizing
Z

∞

(re−x + αui (1 + e−x ))e−rt dt
0



P 
φ
φ


Z ∞
λu
+
ρz
+
ρz
j
j
i
j6=i
1  −rt
1
− 1 x +
= r
e dt,
(1 + e−x ) − e−x
−
λ
λr
α λ
0

J = −

subject to ẋt =

P

j

hj,t , and żi = ui − δzi . When ρ = 0 and λ = 1 we recover the expression from

the proof of Theorem 1,

Z

0

∞

(−xt + e−xt (u−i,t/r − β))e−rt dt.

The Hamiltonian is
!

!

X
1
1
1
1 + e−x
φ
φ
−x
λuj + ρzj + ρzi
H =
− x+
e−rt
−e
−
λ
λr
α λ
j6=i




+γ (n − 1) λuj + ρzjφ + λui + ρziφ + µ (ui − δzi ) .
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We now assume λ = 1 and we seek an interior solution. We then must have
γ + µ = 0.

(22)

The co-state variables obey



φ
1
1
1
∂H
−x (n − 1) λu + nρz
−x
e−rt ,
=
+e
−e
−
γ̇ = −
∂x
λ
λr
α λ

∂H
ρφz φ−1
µ̇ = −
=−
1 + e−x e−rt − γρφz φ−1 e−rt + δµ.
∂zi
λr
We let g := γert and m := µert , and then obtain
− 1) u + nρz φ
ġ = rg + 1 + e
− e−x β,
r

ρφz φ−1
1 + e−x − gρφz φ−1 + (δ + r) m.
ṁ = −
r
−x (n

By differentiating condition (22), we can write
rg + 1 + e−x


(n − 1) u + nρz φ
ρφz φ−1
1 + e−x − gρφz φ−1 + (δ + r) m = 0,
− e−x β −
r
r

(23)

and obtain an expression for g,


φ

ρφz φ−1
−x
−x (n − 1) u + nρz
−x
1−e β+e
.
g=
1+e
−
ρφz φ−1 + δ
r
r
1

(24)

By differentiating condition (23), we obtain
r ġ − ẋe−x
+

ẋe−x


(n − 1) u + nρz φ
ρφ (φ − 1) z φ−2 ż
(n − 1) u̇ + nρφz φ−1 ż
1 + e−x
+ e−x
+ ẋe−x β −
r
r
r

ρφz φ−1
− ġρφz φ−1 − gρφ (φ − 1) z φ−2 ż − (r + δ) ġ = 0.
r
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We can then solve for u̇, and write
u̇ (n − 1) = −ẋ βr − (n − 1) u − nρz φ + ρφz φ−1



− (nρφz − ρφ (φ − 1) (1 + ex ) − rex gρφ (φ − 1)) z φ−2 ż


+ δ + ρφz φ−1 r 2 ex g + rex + (n − 1) u + nρz φ − rβ ,

(25)

where g is given by (24). We now have three autonomous ordinary differential equations, for
u (t), x (t) and z (t). We therefore define
ζ (x) = z (t)
υ (x) = u (t) ,
so that ζ ′ (x) ẋ = ż and υ ′ (x) ẋ = u̇. We then have
υ − δζ
ẋ
[RHS(25)]
,
υ ′ (x) =
ẋ
ζ ′ (x) =

(26)
(27)

with
ẋ = n(λυ + ρζ φ ).
In order to determine the terminal conditions, we construct a frontier (p, z) with the property
that u (p, z (p)) = 0 represents a stopping point (remember that p = (1 + ex )−1 ).
We can write the agents’ equilibrium value as
0 = p (ui + u−i + h) − αui + (1 − r − p (ui + u−i + h)) V (p, h)
X
+Vh (p, h)
φρziφ−1 (ui − δzi ) − p (1 − p) (ui + u−i + h) Vp (p, h) ,
i
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with



X
X
h := ρ ziφ + (n − 1) z φ , and ḣ =
φρziφ−1 żi =
φρziφ−1 (ui − δzi ) .
i

i

It follows that the optimality condition for effort provision is given by
0 = p − α − pV + Vh φρziφ−1 − p (1 − p) Vp .
The continuation payoff, given beliefs p and total accumulated knowledge z, can be written as




h
−st
e−rt dt
V (p, h) = 1 − r
1 − p + p exp − 1 − e
s


Z ∞ 0

h
−st
= rp
1 − exp − 1 − e
e−rt dt,
s
0
Z

∞

where


s := δφ, and h = ρ ziφ + (n − 1) z φ .
Therefore, the stopping frontier (p, z) must solve
p (1 − V ) + Vzi − p (1 − p) Vp − α = 0.
However, notice that
Vp =

V
,
p

and we can therefore express the stopping frontier as the function z ∗ (p) solving
p − V + Vz − α = 0,
with
Vz i =

φρziφ−1 Vh

=

φρziφ−1 rp0

Z

0

∞



 −rt
1 − e−st
h
−st
e dt.
exp − 1 − e
s
s

(28)

Finally, a straightforward argument implies that u = 0 at the stopping point. This means we
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can solve (26) and (27) for x ∈ [x0 , x̄], with terminal conditions


x̄ −1
.
υ (x̄) = 0, ζ (x̄) = z (1 + e )
∗

With this procedure we can obtain the pre-images of points along the stopping frontier z ∗ (p),
and trace the paths back to an initial point (p, z) = (p0 , 0).
We now provide illustrations of how parameters affect the frontier, and a generic path in
(x, z) path. We start with the impact of the decay rate, δ (Figure 10).
Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.75, α=0.25, ρ=1, φ=1

Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.01, α=0.25, ρ=1, φ=1
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Figure 14: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of δ
Finally, we consider the impact of the relative importance of accumulated knowledge in the
arrival rate of success, ρ (Figure 11).
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Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=0.1, φ=1

Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=10, φ=1
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Figure 15: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of ρ
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